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ABSTRACT
Most studies examine how homeland policies influence the host state and what role the 
homeland plays for diaspora. In this paper, I will examine the reasons and conditions for why
ethnic groups do or do not support violent ethnic groups. This study tests how external threats 
impact the level of support within the same ethnic groups. I will examine the causal relationship 
between external pressure and non-cooperation through a structured, comparative study of 
Kurdish ethnic groups.
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11. INTRODUCTION
There has been much research conducted in an attempt to identify and explain why 
ethnic-secessionist movements start, how they can divide countries, how transnational ethnic ties 
impact the relationship between states and diaspora, and why states and ethnic groups support 
violent groups. Most studies primarily focus on the homeland state and diaspora relationship
(Wayland 2004, Sheffer 1986, King and Melvin 1999-2000, Sorrentino 2003). They examine 
how homeland policies influence the host state and what role the homeland plays for diaspora. In 
this paper, I am interested in co-ethnic groups that do not have a homeland or a state to protect 
their economic or political interest. How do these ethnic groups react or respond when a member 
of the same ethnic group has an armed conflict in a neighboring country?1 Moreover, under 
which circumstances do they reject or support co-ethnic violent groups?
In general, I am examining the reasons and conditions for why ethnic groups do or do not
support violent ethnic groups. There are many possible explanations for my question. However, 
it is obvious that ethnic ties play a key role for co-ethnic groups’ respective support of the violent 
group. Existing literature suggests that external threat or interstate rivalries influence states’
decisions to support violent groups.  It has been argued that states believe that the benefit of 
supporting a violent group is higher than the cost. The primary argument for co-ethnic groups 
claims that ethnic ties or a sense of common identity forms the key motivation for the groups’ 
support of one another. Existing studies neither acknowledge nor consider the presence of either 
direct military or economical threat, or both, to a country.  This is crucial as such threats often 
lead to a state’s withdrawal and relinquishment of its support in light of the possible great loss 
                                                          
1
My definition of “armed conflict” drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which defines “an armed conflict as a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which 
at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths each year.”
2incurred should the state involve itself in a direct confrontation. Therefore, I believe ethnic 
groups’ perceptions of threat hold import and thus necessitate clarification as to how a threat 
convinces a group to support or reject support for violent co-ethnic groups. 
I examine the causal relationship between external threat and non-support through a 
structured comparative study of Kurdish ethnic groups, which include the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, the PKK) from Turkey, the Kurdish Autonomous region in 
Iraq, Kurds from Syria, and KDPI, Komala and PJAK from Iran. The time period I primarily 
focus on is the mid 1980’s, when the PKK , the PUK, the KDP, KDPI, and Komala were already 
established and militarily active; and after 1999, when PJAK was established and Syria shut 
down the PKK camps and established their camps in Northern Iraq (Hooper 2007). I explore why 
some Kurdish groups have established cooperation (PKK, PJAK and Syrian Kurds) but why the 
Kurdish Autonomous region (the PUK and the KDP) in Iraq failed to cooperate with the PKK
and PJAK.  Moreover, I determine whether external pressures or threat had any influence on 
their cooperation or non-cooperation.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Rational Choice Theory and Group Favoritism
Some authors explain cooperation and non-cooperation within groups through the lens of 
rational choice theory.  As it is understood, rational choice theory seeks to explain normal human 
behavior, for which there is a certain level of rationality when engaging in a specific behavior. 
Rational choice theory states that “individuals have given goals, wants, tastes or utilities” 
3(Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982, 415). As we know, it is impossible to achieve or 
recognize all goals, due to scarcity. Therefore individuals will decide between alternative choices 
to maximize their self-interest. These give us two different paths. One is to set a course of action 
that diminishes the small separate possible actions. The second involves the actors deciding on 
which path to take for action. As a result, people choose the one that will manifest the most 
desired goal. People decide to join in a collective action based on whether the utility benefits of 
their participation exceed the costs. These actors see cooperation or participation as a net benefit.
The more a group achieves from collective action, the greater the strength of possible collective 
action that will follow (Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982). By conducting a lengthy cost 
and benefit analysis of the situation, rational choice theory examines whether or not groups or 
individuals act rationally. This approach identifies a causal mechanism, which – even when 
applied to relatively obvious cases – can still reveal novel findings.  It also demonstrates the 
results of interaction between actors and groups and between both actors and groups together 
(aggregation), along with the logic behind their decision to not cooperate. Groups make 
decisions or choose their strategies based on the cost and benefits analysis. Individuals and 
groups try to pursue a goal or goals that best fulfill(s) their objective and while they are 
accomplishing their ideal goal they aim for utility maximization (Geddes 2010). However, some 
studies cast doubt on the rational choice theory argument. Group favoritism might explain why a 
certain group would tend to support their members even though the cost exceeds the benefit. 
Axelrod and Hammond (2003) emphasized the importance of ethnocentrism in 
cooperation. This behavior involves cooperation between group members, however not with 
those outside of the group. Therefore, “ethnocentrism can be in-group favoritism or out-group 
hostility” (3). This attitude creates noncooperation with other groups or members. One reason for 
4the development of ethnocentrism is competition between groups or individuals. Groups and 
members tend to interact very often with members of their group, resulting in more strained 
interaction with other groups.  The idea is that when people see themselves as members of a 
group they are more likely to contribute, even if the cost exceeds the benefit. Group members 
tend to favor in-groups even if their self-interest does not apply (Axelrod and Hammond 2003). 
Even though individuals may not gain much from the action, they can still gain in the long term, 
which suggests that members’ decisions to favor the in-group are still rational. For example, 
Manzano and Sanchez evaluate co-ethnic preferences toward co-ethnic candidates. They find 
that Latinos with strong ethnic attachments remain inclined to prefer a co-ethnic group even 
when less qualified than a non-Latino candidate. Latinos with higher levels of Latino group 
identification are also most likely to support a Latino candidate. Latino preferences for co-ethnic 
candidates vary even though their decision upon an individual is most influenced by their level 
of ethnic identification and the type of Latino candidate choice at hand (Soto and Maria 2007).  
Group favoritism and out of group hostility increase in a competitive situation and in the 
presence of an external threat (Axelrod and Hammond 2003). Manzano and Sanchez’s (2010) 
study demonstrates that ethnic identities are important for individual preferences and co-ethnic 
support. It also illustrates that competitive situations between groups increase group favoritism, 
even though it is in neither the members’ nor the individuals’ best interest to vote for a Latino 
candidate. However, Manzano and Sanchez’s study still does not explain how ethnic ties impact 
separatist movements nor explains how these ethnic ties impact transnational ethnic networks. 
Rational choice theory gives us some understanding of group cooperation and how individuals 
makes their choices. However, to have a better understanding why an ethnic group seeks a
5separatist or secessionist movement may help us to understand why ethnic group cooperation is 
essential for such movements. 
2.2 Ethnic Secessionist/Separatist Movements
Horowitz (1981) defines separatism as an idea that demands “‘political self-expression’ -
usually on a territorial basis – and is ‘a necessary concomitant of group distinctiveness’” (166). 
Tir (2005) declares that secession is an effort to settle an internal territorial dispute through the 
division of a country into new, secessionist (Southern Sudan), and rump (Northern Sudan) states.
This means separatist or secessionist movements usually demand for the creation of a separate 
state or regional autonomy within the existing state. Separatist movements generally seek to 
achieve statehood by way of armed conflict. Ethnic secessionist movements are neither recent 
nor purely ethnic phenomena. Sweden and Norway split up their union in 1905 and China and 
Taiwan divided for ideological, as well as economic reasons (Tir, 2005).  
International politics, via the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state, 
largely determine if a secessionist movement will accomplish its goal (Horowitz (1981, 167). 
The international community also holds the power of recognition, which can be utilized for 
leverage against the state (by threatening to give recognition) and against the separatists (by 
refusing to give recognition). If the international community forces the government to solve the 
problems peacefully, the separatists may possibly drop the demands (Tir 2005). Nevertheless, 
this does not guarantee peaceful resolution. Moreover, territorial disputes after separation can 
also be problematic. 
Tir also examines peaceful and violent secessionist movements. Some disputes are not 
solved peacefully, in which case leaders of the rump states attempt to retake the lost land, 
6whereas secessionist states try to acquire more land from rump states or another secessionist 
state, as seen in the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. Therefore peaceful versus 
violent secession can also affect a movement’s future desire. Most ethnically-based secessions 
tend to play an important part in a conflict’s onset (Tir 2005). Sometimes a secessionist state still 
does not create ethnically homogeneous states. The treatment of minority groups creates tension 
between the states and each state tries to protect their “ethnic brethren who have been ‘left’ in the 
other state (719).  This creates a complicated relationship between “the states in which they live 
(host states), and the actions of governments that might make some historical or cultural claim to 
represent them (kin states)” (King and Melvin 1999-2000, 108). Nevertheless, separatist ideas 
can be a great threat to some countries. For instance, most African states face severe “racial, 
religious, tribal, and linguistic divisions” (Saideman 1997, 723). States fear that should some 
group successfully question artificial African boundaries then all the boundaries will be 
challenged, thus undermining the entire system (Saideman 1997 and Herbst 1986). Therefore "… 
all parties know that once African boundaries begin to change there would be an indefinite 
period of chaos... the grave danger of not cooperating is clear to all" (Herbst 1989, 690).
Woodward (1995) argues that western countries wanted to protect Yugoslavia’s territorial 
integrity because they thought such an action would create an example for the Soviet Union.  
However, mutual vulnerability still fails to explain how leaders deal with critical situations 
because not all states follow the same solutions to common problems. Vulnerability can be 
perceived differently with diverse interests (Miller 1995 and Morgan and Bickers 1992). 
Saideman (1997) argues that politicians make decisions depending upon constituents’ 
ethnic ties.  If politicians’ constituents possess ethnic ties to secessionist groups then states tend 
to support the secessionist groups. If they have ties with host states then the states side 
7accordingly. This suggests that cooperation must promote political benefits, otherwise,
cooperation is unlikely. Most African countries cooperated during the Congo Crisis and Nigerian 
Civil War due to their domestic political motivations (Saideman 1997).  Nevertheless, 
Saideman’s study fails to provide much information in regards to the relationship between kin 
and host states; therefore, an examination of the ethnic-nationalist network will provide us with 
knowledge of ethnic group cooperation. 
2.3 Ethno-Nationalist Networks
According to Wayland (2004), the relationship between host and kin states is called an 
ethno-nationalist networks. The term ‘transnationalism’ first appeared in the 1970s. It brought
forth and emphasized “the role of non-state actors”. The term mostly correlates with economic 
affairs such as the role of international organizations and companies in international affairs 
(Wayland 2004, 407). Increases in transnational non-governmental organizations (NGO) draw 
scholar’s attention to examine these organizations and their activities. Wayland refers to
transnationalism as “identities and intra-ethnic relations that transcend state borders” (p. 48). 
Transnational ethnic networks are established between co-ethnic groups and among several 
states as well as between diaspora communities and co-ethnics in the homeland (Wayland 2004).  
Diasporas are ethnic groups of migrant origins living in host countries that still have strong ties 
and economic links to their countries of origin, also known as their homeland (Sheffer 1986). 
These networks may interact directly with homeland politics and also lobby their “host” states to 
change their policies toward the homeland. Basically, transnational ethnic networks help and 
broaden support for their homeland. In the case of Tamil diaspora living abroad, they have 
established political offices overseas and have financially supported the Tamil insurgencies to 
8maintain an independent homeland (Wayland 2004). However, not all ethnic groups aim for an 
independent state.
Sorrentino’s (2003) definition gives us a better understanding. He defines ethnic 
nationalism as “…a group with members that may or may not exist within the boundaries of a 
single state, yet whose members can be categorized as a group of individuals that share a 
common ethnic nationalist identity” (10). These groups may share an interest in the welfare of 
their transnational community as a whole; however, this does not mean that the existence of a 
sovereign homeland is the primary interest of all members of the community. The ethnic ties are
also influenced by state identity as well as a diffuse ethnic population which plays an important 
role in interstate relations. If the connection and relationship is strong between kin state and 
diaspora then it may cause the kin state to feel pressured and responsible when ethnic diaspora is 
seriously threatened (King and Melvin 1999-2000). Transborder ethnic ties and networks can 
also possibly increase the insecurity of host states and affect the incorporation of diaspora into 
political and economic domestic affairs in host states (Sorrentino 2003).
Homelands are more likely to help and interact with their diaspora when there is threat to 
their diaspora from other international players (Sorrentino 2003). Hungary and Ukraine support 
their diaspora in neighboring countries. The constitutional duties of the Ukrainian president 
include "securing the national-cultural, spiritual, and linguistic needs of Ukrainians abroad” 
(King and Melvin 1999-2000, 125). Hungary and Ukrainian laws give special entitlements to 
their diaspora when they visit the country. The law protects co-ethnic interest and maintains 
awareness of their national identity, while still encouraging living in a host state.  This is called 
“a ‘transnational’ or a cross border form of ‘citizenship’” (Steward 2009, 3). However, the Status 
Law (Steward 2003) negatively affected some states such as Slovakia and Slovenia.  Still, 
9support from the homeland may create more problems for diaspora. For example, China’s 
“nationality’ law has been supported by adoptive states to minimize the participation of diaspora 
in their own domestic affairs. The Chinese diaspora depends heavily on China for support, which 
gives an opportunity to the adoptive states to minimize the incorporation of diaspora in their 
domestic affairs (Sorrentino 2003). 
The strong ties between a homeland and diaspora may even result in a conflict with the 
host state. The politics of the kin state are more essential than the politics of the host state 
because kin states are able to influence a diaspora’s actions with their policies. However, ethnic 
linkages do not ensure that kin states will act as a protector or provide economic resources for 
the ethnic war in the host state. In fact, most kin states in Eastern European countries ignored the 
interest of co-ethnic groups in 1991 (King and Melvin 1999-2000).  This means interaction 
between all homelands and diaspora is not always consistent (King and Melvin 1999-2000 and 
Sorrentino 2003). Sorrentino claims that cultural similarities and power impact the relationship 
of a homeland/diaspora and their cooperation. However, the authors do not explain what happens 
in a situation in which ethnic groups do not have a homeland state to protect their interest in host 
state. What role does the dynamic of ethnic groups play for states’ behavior and decision-
making? 
Davis and Moore (1997) point out the importance of the status of co-ethnic groups in 
these countries. If members of an ethnic group hold higher policy positions or are more 
politically active and organized in one state than members of the same group in a different state, 
does this affect the states’ relationship? The group that is incorporated into the power structure of 
a state will force or demand both their state and the other state to modify their policies and 
correct the status differential. The authors claim that the foreign policy of both countries would 
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be more conflicted, less collaborative, and hold a generally negative attitude (Davis and Moore 
(1997). This argument assumes that the relatively powerful ethnic group will protect the interests 
of their co-ethnic groups. Even though these groups are co-ethnic, we cannot assume that all 
ethnic groups will help or cooperate when another group is having an ongoing ethnic conflict. 
One reason for their non-cooperation could be that diaspora is limited in capabilities. 
Wayland points out that while the Sri Lankan conflict was supported by diaspora, that 
support was outweighed by the pressure from Norway, Japan, Canada and international 
organizations such as the World Bank and the European Commission, who were pushing for 
reconstruction and involved in the Sri Lankan peace process. This example demonstrates that 
transnational ethnic networks are not alone in impacting and influencing conflict (Wayland 
2004). Nevertheless, not all rebels receive support from the international community. When and 
under which circumstances do ethnic conflicts receive external support?
2.4 Why States and Ethnic Groups do or do not Support Violent Ethnic Groups
There are varying reasons for states’ support of violent groups. States will react and
respond more strongly to an enemy closer in proximity than one located further away. This 
means that states are more sensitive to regional crises in neighboring countries. This translates to
a higher likelihood of state support of violent groups within neighboring countries that they 
perceive as a potential threat (Saideman 2001).  Pakistan has supported both the ATTF and the 
BLTF against India because it perceives India as a potential threat (Salehyan, Gleditsch, 
Cunningham (2011).   
Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham (2011) argue that strong and very weak rebel groups 
tend to get less external support. Strong rebel groups gather resources from domestic sources. 
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Even though they can gain more resources they will less likely accept external support because 
they do not want to be constrained or imposed upon by external actors. The very weak rebels 
would rather gain international attention and support but because they are too weak, external 
actors tend to not invest too much. 
Ethnic or religious ties also play an important role in ethnic mobilizations and support. If
a violent group has a large transnational constituency of support then states are more likely to 
support the group. For instance, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey and violent 
Palestinian groups receive wide support from co-ethnic groups and diaspora due to their religious 
and ideological commitments. Moreover, group sympathizers, especially in neighboring 
countries, force their states to support or defend their group during the conflict. Tamil Nadu in 
India demanded India’s government to support the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka’s 
conflict (Jenne 2007, Saideman 1997, Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011).  This suggests 
that states may support violent groups to satisfy their constituencies or to control their minorities. 
Nevertheless, states sometimes support violent groups due to their political interests.
Transnational linkages and interstate rivalries are very important for support for rebel 
groups, and those conflicts in which the government side has external support are much more 
likely to also result in support for the rebels (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, 32). States 
that have interstate rivalries tend to support violent groups instead of invading a country.  In this 
way states avoid potential costs such as military economic costs, casualties, risk of invasion, and 
political and economical sanctions (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, Gartner and Seguta 
1998).  Supporting violent ethnic groups against the targeted state also functions as a tool to 
destabilize the targeted country (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011).  Sudan supported the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has been involved in military conflict with Uganda. 
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Uganda also supported the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) against Sudan. Both 
countries used these violent groups against each other to weaken and destabilize their enemy 
(Prunier 2004). However, it is not always in the states’ or groups’ best interest to support violent 
groups. 
If violent ethnic groups are either militarily weak or fractured then states tend to not 
support these groups. States or groups may perceive these violent groups as incapable of 
challenging their host state. Furthermore, violent groups possessing strong central leadership and 
coordination capabilities have more potential to attract the support of states and their co-ethnic 
groups (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011). Equally important are shared goals and 
preferences between violent groups and both ethnic groups and states. If group preferences or 
goals do not match with those of the state or co-ethnic groups, they typically do not support the 
violent group. However, ethnic and religious ties to violent groups may decrease and diverge
preferences, “since a common worldview and shared cultural understandings often indicate 
similar preferences” (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, 715, Davis, Moore 1997, 
Saideman 2001).  In this case, co-ethnic groups may still support violent groups due to their 
ethnic ties. Nevertheless, states may not support groups if they do not have either religious or 
ethnic ties. 
Another big reason for states’ willingness to support violent groups is that states may lose 
some or partial autonomy over the goal they perceive. In another word, a state may grant
permission to a group to conduct and use its territory, which increase a state’s risk of losing
“agency and autonomy over the objectives” (Saleyhan 2010 and Salehyan, Gleditsch, 
Cunningham 2011, 716). However, if a state’s benefit of supporting violent ethnic group exceeds 
the cost (loss of some autonomy, etc.), then states may be convinced to support the group. 
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
The main question driving this inquiry is why and when the same ethnic national groups 
support or do not support co-ethnic violent groups? If so, how and under what conditions do they 
support or reject support? Does external pressure or threat have any effect on a group reluctance 
to provide support?  In order to approach these questions with greater specificity this section will 
delineate the variables used in this paper, as well as present explanations for their use.  Following 
this organization, possible problems with the theory will be examined in light of former studies 
and a set of hypotheses will be introduced for future testing. 
I will examine the reasons why and under what conditions ethnic groups support violent 
ethnic groups. It is clear that there are many possible explanations for my question. However, it 
is obvious ethnic ties or a sense of common identity is the key factor for groups to support one 
another; however that does not necessarily presuppose a common goal. The authors (Manzano 
and Sanchez, Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, Davis, Moore 1997, and Saideman 2001) 
argue that ethnic and religious ties to violent groups may decrease and divert preferences and 
differences, allowing groups to support one another. For states, cost benefit analysis plays a 
central role for their decision to support or not support a violent group. These analyses also 
suggest that mutual interest is not always necessary for a state or group to support their co-ethnic 
groups. Nevertheless, we cannot assure that all ethnic groups will help and support when another 
group is having an ongoing ethnic conflict. Existing literature give some explanation for non-
cooperation among co-ethnic groups such as weak and fracture groups may not seen as capable 
of doing or changing anything or no clear leadership may discourage groups to not support. 
Existing literature also reveals that external threat or interstate rivalries influence a state’s 
decision to support violent groups (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, Gartner and Seguta 
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1998, Saideman 2001). States believe that the benefit of supporting a violent group is higher 
than the cost. This is crucial as such threats often lead to a state’s withdrawal and relinquishment 
of its support in light of the possible great loss incurred should the state involve itself in a direct 
confrontation. Does threat perception apply to non-cooperation among co-ethnic groups? In other 
words, if there is external pressure or a direct threat due to a group’s cooperation with their co-
ethnic violent groups, how do those co-ethnic violent groups react? Do they still support their co-
ethnic groups if the cost of continued support of a violent group is higher than before?
My analyses demonstrate that ethnic group perception of threat can be important, thus 
requiring clarification as to how threat convinces a co-ethnic group to support or not support 
violent groups. In determining when groups decide to support and not support, I am using the 
theory that group cooperation based on utility is a key component for a group decision, which 
measures whether the benefits of their participation exceed the cost (Hechter, Friedman, and 
Appelbaum 1982). I believe that previous studies that employed this model did not appropriately 
account for the effects of external forces on group or state decisions. The expectation that utility 
benefit would be an important factor for a group’s willingness or unwillingness to support is 
understandable, but the former assertion is not as clear-cut as Hechter, Friedman, and 
Appelbaum (1982) contend. This theory is largely based on rational choice theory, which states 
that all groups / states and leaders act rationally because maximizing their interest is the most 
important factor in their decision. States and co-ethnic groups may be forced to act in certain 
way because external actors (this can be either the host state that have the ethnic war or 
hegemonic or strong-influential state/s or the other neighboring host countries that accommodate 
co- ethnic groups) may threaten groups for a great loss. For instance, should external actors be 
involved, ethnic groups may face greater losses than gains while supporting their ethnic groups, 
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since groups are limited in capabilities.2 These losses may be territorial, economic, political, or 
some other form. Therefore, group still make decisions rationally by conducting cost and benefit 
analysis of the situation however their decision is influenced largely based on external pressures 
and threats.
The type or level of support and the method in response to external pressure possessed by 
the same ethnic groups will be defined as dependent variables.  Examples of the type of support 
to be examined include the following: (1) when one group is under armed attack the other group 
does not help or when groups are equally threatened, they do not act together. Help is hereby 
defined as financial aid (money or other means); actively fighting against the enemy; supporting 
group members and leaders; military and economic agreements; helping them to gather weapons; 
supporting them in the international; (2) Support also includes meetings between state or group 
leaders and oral statements of support (some of these measures are adopted from Davis and 
Moore 1997). For states, they may ask a group to leave their territory or cut military or financial 
aid to the violent group.
The independent variable examined in this analysis will be the existence of external 
threat or pressure on ethnic groups. The type of external threat or pressure is divided into the 
following different factors:  (1) threats of military intervention or minor verbal conflict and 
threats by the host state, including loss of jobs or prison sentences; (2) threats of discontinued 
economic support between the state and group or between state and state, including canceling 
economic agreements and ending economic activities (which itself can include ceasing the 
provision of arms and weapons or direct financial aid); (3) threats of international pressure such 
                                                          
2 I treat and view groups as a single unitary actor engaged in the decision-making process. This definition was drawn from rational choice theory, 
which defines states as unitary actors (Doyle 1997). Realists argue that unitary actors act to maximize gains and minimize losses (Morgenthau 
1967). Therefore, the group decision can be made by a person or small group by choosing the set of alternatives that most maximizes utility.  
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as diplomatic, political, and economic sanctions. These measures of direct interaction can 
collectively lead to either support or conflict (some of these measures are adopted from Davis 
and Moore 1997). The form of external actors will be divided into two broad categories; one is 
state actors and second is non-state actors. Non-state actors are defined as group leaders and 
influential and powerful group members. Group leaders have a significant impact on state and 
groups’ decisions to support or not.
3.1 From these frameworks, the following hypotheses can be extrapolated for testing:
1. Groups that have strong ethnic ties will likely support each other.
According to studies conducted by Jenne (2007), Saideman (1997), Salehyan, Gleditsch, 
Cunningham (2011), Manzano and Sanchez, Wayland (2004), King and Melvin (1999) and 
many others, ethnic ties play an important role in ethnic mobilization and support. I will test this 
argument to see if ethnic ties always convince groups to cooperate.  
2. A host state’s relationship with a violent ethnic group impacts the level of 
cooperation among co-ethnic groups.
For example; strong ties with either a neighboring country or a country supportive to a 
certain violent group will likely influence cooperation among co-ethnic group.  The opposite can 
also be true. Moreover, if groups receive greater internal threats from their host state (due to their 
support for co-ethnic violent groups) there will likely be non-cooperation among co-ethnic 
groups.
3. The level of external pressure or threat (from low to high)3 from a neighboring 
will decrease the level of cooperation among co-ethnic groups.
                                                          
3
The type of external threat or pressure is divided into the following different factors:  (1) threats of military intervention or 
slight verbal conflict and threat; (2) threats of discontinued economic support between the state and group or between state and 
state, including canceling economic agreements and ending economic activities (which itself can include ceasing the provision of 
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The foundational hypothesis for this study is summarized in the above statement.  There 
is a significant foundation to my theory that claims external pressure creates the initial 
foundation for a lack of cooperation within groups. This hypothesis is based in part on the claims 
of Axelrod and Hammond (2003), which conclude that out-group hostility increases in a 
competitive situation and when there is an external threat.  My assumption tests whether external 
pressure will provide reason for groups and states to not support a violent group. 
4. Past experiences of conflict or cooperation between co-ethnic groups will likely 
influence future cooperation and non-cooperation. 
This hypothesis largely drew from Saideman (2001). Moreover, these hypothesizes are 
also one part of Larson’s (1997) argument. Larson argues that the negative perception and 
security dilemma causes groups to see each other as “us” and “them”. Once this logic takes root 
in a group it becomes very difficult to collaborate together. This logic can also be applied to past 
interactions. If the groups previously cooperated for a greater gain and left with a good 
impression then we can expect them to cooperate again or at least not act against one another. 
However, if the groups or states fought against one another in the past, again for a greater gain, 
there might exist negative feelings between the two groups and states, making it difficult to 
cooperate. The root of the problem is still a cost benefit analysis that impacts groups and states’ 
decisions and remains influenced by external actors. Therefore, I expect to find correlation 
between external pressure or threat and cooperation, regardless of whether pressure is for or 
against cooperation. I will also examine whether past cooperation or non-cooperation among 
groups and states in the past has had and/or will have positive or negative impacts for future 
cooperation.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
arms and weapons or direct financial aid); (3) threats of international pressure such as diplomatic, political, and economic
sanctions.
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5. Competition or struggle for group leadership or for political and economical 
power (if there is more than one group) will likely cause non-cooperation among 
the same co-ethnic groups.
This hypothesis has adopted from Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham’s (2011) 
argument, which suggests that groups possessing strong central leadership and coordination 
capabilities have more potential to attract the support of states and their co-ethnic groups. I argue 
that competition between groups for leadership, economic, political power, or any combination 
of these, will decrease the likelihood of group cooperation. 
6. Different dialects between the same ethnic groups will likely decrease the level of 
cooperation.
7. Religious differences within the same ethnic groups will likely decrease the level 
of cooperation.
Hypothesis 6 and 7 implemented from multiple authors (Manzano and Sanchez, 
Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, Davis, Moore 1997, and Saideman 2001) who argue 
that ethnic and religious ties to violent groups may decrease and divert preferences and 
differences, allowing groups to support one another. This argument was adopted because
religious and linguistic differences may cause groups to not cooperate4. 
8. The level of similar ideologies (from low to high) will increase the level of 
cooperation between co-ethnic groups.
                                                          
4 Majority of Kurds are Sunni however one third of are Shia Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran (Turkey: a 
country study 1995, Al-Khoei 2009). However, the Shia Kurds emphasize their ethnic identities more than religious 
identities. Moreover, “the Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iran- make comparatively less of a distinction between 
themselves regardless of religion or sect” (Al-Khoei 2009). There are also linguistic divisions among Kurdish 
groups. Kurmanji is spoken in Turkey, Syria and northern Iraq. Sorani dialect is more in central Iraq and Iran. 
Zazaki is spoken in eastern Turkey and Gorani dialect in northeastern Iraq. Majority of Kurds speak Kurmanci 
(Kaya 2011, Berberoglu 2004). In my examination, I did not find any significant result show that Kurdish ethnic 
groups do not cooperate due to their religious identities and linguistic differences. 
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Hypothesis 8 was adopted from Jenne 2007, Saideman 1997, Salehyan, Gleditsch,
Cunningham 2011. They argue that violent groups receive wide support from co-ethnic groups 
and diaspora due to their ideological commitments. I will test whether or not differences in 
ideologies influence group cooperation. My definition of ideologies will be political, covering 
both conservative and liberal (leftist and rightist) ideologies.
9. Great powers can cause or prevent co-ethnic groups to cooperate. 
Hypothesis 9 has drawn from Wayland’s (2004) argument. The author argues that 
diaspora is limited in capabilities and international organizations and powerful countries help
diaspora during peace processes. I believe that the international community can also influence 
the relationship of co-ethnic groups. Great powers such as the US, USSR or Soviet Union, and 
China can solve the dispute between co-ethnic groups, which may cause cooperation. Or they 
can pressure groups to not cooperate or help. 
For this paper, I will mainly focus on examining hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9. I will only 
be able to highlight and address the other hypotheses, however, due to space constraints.  
4. RESEARCH DESIGN
Table 1 Violent Kurdish Groups













I will examine the causal relationship between external pressure and non cooperation 
through a structured comparative study of Kurdish ethnic groups, which are Kurdistan Workers 
Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, the PKK) from Turkey, the Kurdish Autonomous region in 
Iraq, PJAK (the Militant Party for Free of Kurdistan) from Iran, and Kurds from Syria. Syrian 
Kurds and Iranian Kurds are helping the PKK in their goal of independence. Nonetheless, the 
PUK and the KDP have supported the PKK, though they eventually withdrew support
(McKeirnan 2006). In fact, violence has occurred between the PUK-KDP coalitions and the PKK 
because Turkey threatens and forces these groups to not just cooperate, but also to act violently 
against the PKK (McKeirnan 2006). There is variation in group cooperation; therefore it is 
essential to examine the reasons. 
The time period from my examination stretches from 1923 to 2012, however, I will 
primarily focus on two periods of cooperation among Kurdish groups: the mid 1980s, when the 
PKK was established in Syria; and after 1999, when Syria shut down the PKK camps and 
established their camps in Northern Iraq (Hooper 2007). Moreover, PJAK was also established 
late 90s. The reason for my time selection is that most violent Kurdish groups established 
themselves and became active after the 1980s. After 1999, the PKK’s relocation from Syria to 
Iraq will allow me to examine group cooperation within those states. I will also primarily focus 
on cooperation or non-cooperation among violent ethnic groups’ such as the PKK, PUK, KDP 
(now known as the Kurdish Autonomous region), and PJAK, because I am more interested in the 
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dynamic and relationship between violent ethnic groups. My study will not examine cooperation 
or non-cooperation between Iranian and Syrian Kurds due to geographical restriction which may 
restrain their ability to cooperate. Furthermore, it is difficult to examine Syrian group 
cooperation with other Kurdish groups due to many fractions and small groups. Therefore, my 
examination of Syrian Kurdish cooperation with co-ethnic violent Kurdish groups in neighboring 
countries will be based on general reactions to and support of Syrian Kurds from these groups.
I will use qualitative research design methods to develop my argument. Possible 
methodological arguments regarding this project might include the difficulty of proving whether 
groups support or not, based on external threat or pressure.  In order to combat this ambiguity, I 
will examine most similar-cases (the Kurdish groups that cooperate and do not cooperate), which 
allows me to control many variables, such as history, culture, and religion. These control 
variables are important because by controlling them I can avoid analyzing groups that do not 
cooperate based on these factors. Comparing the most similar groups will allow us to see if 
group decisions towards non-cooperation are truly made based on external pressure. 
The PKK is generally considered a strong violent group with clear leadership and no past 
experience of fragmentation.  Examining the PKK will allow me to control for groups’ inability 
to gain state or co-ethnic group support based on their fragmentation, weaknesses, or lack of 
clear leadership. Moreover, Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq all have identity issues. They 
all struggle to gain their ethnic rights and freedoms which will permit me to control groups that 
do not share a common identity or goals. Furthermore, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey all have 
Kurdish population in their territory and have all been challenged by their Kurdish diaspora. This 
will allow me to control for states that do not have ethnic problems, which may allow them to act 
more freely. 
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4.1 Way to Measure My Hypothesis 
I will examine past experiences of support and non-support among groups and states 
toward violent groups in my empirical analysis. I will research this through process tracing and I 
will gather information from multiple political, historical, and scholarly works.  
My first measure is to define the role of the U.S. in Kurdish case. I will examine the 
relationship between the U.S. and Kurds in different region. For example: how does Turkey’s 
relationship with the U.S influence Iraqi Kurds decision-making toward the PKK?  I will look 
into present and historical records to examine importance of the U.S in the Kurdish problem. I 
will also explore all meetings, statements and agreements between the U.S. and countries that are 
mentioned above and those between the U.S. and Kurds in regards to the Kurdish issue. This 
examination will demonstrate the level of external pressure and the external actors’ roles in co-
ethnic behavior and decision-making. 
I will also examine the number of military interventions against these violent groups (the 
PKK, KDP, PUK, and PJAK) to stop their activities (e.g. the number of Turkish military 
interventions against the PKK in Syria and Northern Iraq). This is one of the most appropriate 
measures for my study, which predicts that an external pressure exists. If the number of 
interventions is high, then that would suggest that Turkey or other countries represent a constant 
external threat to Kurdish cooperation because - due to violent behavior of neighboring countries 
or external actors - Kurdish groups and states would be afraid to support the PKK. This study 
could potentially reveal that groups may support a government that intervenes to prevent military 
interventions in their region. To explore this, I will collect information from historical records 
and newspapers. 
23
Natali’s (2010) book The Kurdish Quasi-state, Fielding-Smith’s (2010) and 
Bhadrakumar’s (2007) articles, the Middle East Reports, and other economic news provide us 
with information about the role of neighboring governments and companies in influencing the 
level of support. Higher levels of economic involvement will demonstrate that these countries 
have more leverage or potential to influence group cooperation. For instance, the economic 
agreement between Turkish companies in Northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdish groups will illustrate 
that Turkey has the capability to influence and pressure the Kurdish government and/or groups in 
Northern Iraq. 
I will examine the number of meetings between ethnic groups and neighboring countries 
that have a large population of the same ethnic groups (e.g. the meetings that have occurred 
between leaders of the Turkish government and Iraqi Kurdish groups from 2000 to 2011) and the 
number of meetings between state leaders and the PKK and explore the reasons for each visit. If 
the number of visits is high we can determine that there is a high level of interaction between 
these governments and groups. It will also determine the foundation of their relationship. I will 
collect the number of visits and information about the motivations behind the visits from 
historical records and newspapers.
I will also examine the language and attitude of leaders toward other governments or 
groups to specify their relationship and the level of pressure they experience to act against or 
stop supporting the PKK (e.g. the language of Turkish leaders toward Iraqi government or the 
Kurdish Regional Government). I will collect the information from a variety of newspapers, 
including international, regional, and local newspapers, and from Kurdish web sites. Some of 
these newspapers include Hurriyet, Zaman, Sabah, Radical, the New York Times, the
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Washington Post, and web sites such as KurdishMedia.com, KurdMedia.com, Kurds.com, and 
the Kurdish Regional Government home page.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Kurdish nationalism started in the late Ottoman period. Nationalist movements were 
“neither unified nor linear” (Klein, 2007, 137). Kurdish nationalism was fragmented due to the 
long disputes of notable families and was also limited by Naqshbandi shaykhs (Ozoglu 2001). 
There were several movements started by different actors who had different views about the 
situation.  Influenced by European nationalism sentiment, they created Kurdish clubs. The goal 
of these clubs was “to protect the rights of Kurds,” however these rights were intended to protect 
the privileges of the Kurdish tribal chiefs. After the Young Turk revolution in 1908 the goal had 
changed to autonomy or cultural protection of Kurds. These clubs emphasized that “the 
education, modernization and protection of the freedoms of the Kurdish people was important 
not just for Kurdish society, but for the good of the empire overall” (Klein 2007, 139). This 
demonstrates that clubs did not have separatist views. Most of these Kurdish nationalists were 
Ottomanists until after WWI (Klein 2007). 
These clubs did not begin to make political and national claims until 1918. Following the 
formation of the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (SAK), the club’s leaders desired 
independence and/or autonomy. However, two years after its establishment, SAK split due to 
ideological reasons among members (Ozoglu 2001). Ozoglu’s study demonstrates that “pre-
existing feuds between these families contributed greatly to this ideological split” (387), which 
caused them to not cooperate.
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When the Ottoman Empire defeated by the Allied Powers and the treaty of Sevres signed 
that promised the Kurds an independent homeland of their own. Nevertheless, the rise of Mustafa 
Kemal in Turkey and British economic interest in Iraq did not let Kurdish people have their own 
state (Entessar 1989).
5.1 Kurds from Turkey
  Twenty percent of the Kurdish population lives in Turkey (Gunter 2000) and when 
Ataturk and Ismet Inonu built the new nation, neither of them considered minorities. They 
formed radical reforms such as having one official Turkish language and teaching Turkish 
history exclusively.  They denied the existence of minorities (Yavuz 2001). By doing this, they 
ignored the existence of distinct ethnic groups like Kurds and other small groups. The Turkish 
government even declared that Kurds were “mountain Turks who have forgotten their native 
tongue and now returning to their Turkish origins” (Entessar 1989, 12-13). 
The result of transforming a multi-ethnic empire to a nation-state created socio-political 
problems in Turkey and the consequences of the transformation have seen within Kurdish tribes 
and leaders. The state still ignored the Kurdish ethnicity. They preferred to portray them as been 
backward and reactionary people who were a threat to the Turkish state (Yavuz and Gunter 
2001). These prompted Turkey to start assimilation policies toward the Kurdish population. The 
Turkish and Kurdish conflict started mid 1980s and has claimed at least 44,000 lives lost (Shaoul 
2011).
Kurdish university students in Ankara and Kurdish intellectuals created the PKK and the 
SPTK (the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan) in 1974, respectively.  Abdullah Ocalan became 
the first and only leader for the PKK. The SPTK supported a federal state that would include 
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equal rights for both Kurds and Turks. On the other side, the PKK was a still is the most radical 
Kurdish movement demanding for Kurdish autonomy and they achieved mass mobilization in 
Southeast Anatolia. The organization had a large amount of workers and peasants due to social 
ideas it contains (Entessar 1989).  At first, the PKK began to demand for the Kurdish rights. It 
also helped the Kurdish population acknowledge their Kurdish identity.  The government did not 
recognize the demand and arrested or killed whoever disagreed with the regulations of the 
country. A coup in 1980 used violence and coercion against Kurdish people. These negative 
actions strengthened and politicized Kurdish nationalism and identity (Yavuz 2001). Prior to the 
military coup during the 1980s, the PKK left Turkey and fled to Syria where the training camps 
were established by the PKK. After the 1980 coup, the PKK started the first attack against the 
Turkish military in 1984 (Hassanpour 1994). The guerrilla success in the 1980s was due to 
government repression, which leads to the mobilization and politicization of large masses into a 
national movement. 
Sadly, violence became the most prevalent problem in Turkey.  The war worsened 
between 1984 and 1991 and, “according to state statistics, since 1984, as many as 4,302 civil 
servants, 5,018 soldiers, 4,400 civilians, and 23,279 the PKK terrorists were killed in the region, 
and thousands wounded” (Yavuz 2001).  The civil war destroyed 3,000 villages, leaving more 
than 3,000,000 people displaced (Gunter 2000).  The PKK was supported by foreign countries 
such as Russia, Syria, and Greece. To the extreme, Syria became a military base for the PKK 
(Yavuz and Gunter 2001). In 1998, in order to end Kurdish violence, the Turkish state threatened 
to go to war with Syria if they did not expel the leader of the Kurdish movement, Ocalan, from 
the country (Yavuz 2001).Ocalan was arrested in 1999 (Marcus 2007).  
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5.2 Kurds from Syria
Syrian Kurds number about two-million people, making up ten percent of the population
(Sinclair and Kajjo. 2011). It is the largest ethnic population in Syria. Syrian Kurds speaks 
Kurmanci which is the largest Kurdish dialect. Moreover, the majority of Syrian Kurds are 
Sunnis. Syrian Kurds live mostly along the border of Turkey and Iraq where their fellow Kurds 
live. This has had great influence on Syrian Kurds (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). Since, Syrian 
Kurds do not have any border with Iranian Kurds, which suggest that they have less interaction 
with Iranian Kurds5. In Syria, Kurds did not have any internal problems, as a result of “benign 
rule of the French mandatory authorities”. However, tribal elements were seen along the Turkish 
border. Syrian Kurds were sympathetic to the Kurdish raids in Ararat and Dersim (1937) in 
Turkey. This alarmed the Turkish government and led it to replace some of the chiefs from the 
border region. In 1946 the French withdrew from Syria. 
In 1957, the Partiya Democrat a Kurdistan Suriye (KDPI) was established.  Kurds still 
were able to adapt to new changes in their political and living conditions until the establishment 
of pan-Arabism in the 1960, which threatened and persecuted the members of the Democratic 
Party of Kurdistan (DPKS). This party demanded for Kurdish representation, linguistic, and 
cultural independence in Syria (Edmonds 1971; Ahmed and Gunter 2007). The Syrian 
government banned Kurdish culture, language, music. Moreover, the public attacked the Kurds. 
Nevertheless, Syrian Kurds’ nationalism was the weakest compared to Kurdish nationalism in 
other countries. Some argue that Arab nationalism was important reason for weak Syrian 
Kurdish nationalism, which attacked Kurdish nationalism (Ahmed and Gunter 2007).  
                                                          
5 My study will not examine cooperation or non-cooperation between Iranian and Syrian Kurds due to geographical restriction 
which may restrain their ability to cooperate. 
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Under the Assad regime, the government banned Kurds from using their languages for 
publication or education. The regime also banned Kurdish political parties. Some Syrian Kurds 
were even denied, or in some cases stripped, of their citizenship. These policies left Kurds to live 
in a country in which they cannot own a home or a car, and face significant professional 
obstacles (Marcus 2007). The Kurdish issue was not arguable (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). In the 
1960s, the KDPS decided to use revolutionary means to gain freedom, however a small number 
of Kurds joined. Members of KDPS were arrested, including leader Hamid Haj Darwish, 
released ten months later. Many believed that Darwish collaborated with the Syrian government 
that led the first split in 1965 within KDPS (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). 
Osman Sabri created Partiya Demokrat a Kurdi li Suriye and Darwish established the 
Partiya Demokrata Pesveru a Kurdi li Suriye. Sabri wanted to use revolutionary techniques 
however Darwish was willing to use softer tactics to achieve Kurdish rights. Darwish also 
cooperated with Talabani whereas Sabri supported Barzani. Nevertheless, there were more splits 
within these organizations; again, organizations influenced by Iraqi Kurdish groups. Barzani 
tried to unite and mediate between the parties, but unity was not possible. The reason for disunity 
was tribal ties with political and ethnic connection and as well as ideological differences which 
heightened it. The new party, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria, was established by Daham 
Miro in 1972 which had strong ties with KDP. However, in 1972, many arrested and attacked
against Syrian Kurds, which scared the Syrian Kurdish movement. During this time, only a small 
group favored use of violence.  The KDPS split more by each decades during the 1970s, 80s and 
90s. There are many small illegal Kurdish parties and there have not been many Kurdish groups
to openly ask for independence (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). For my study, it is difficult to 
examine Syrian group cooperation with other Kurdish groups due to many fractions and small 
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groups. Therefore, my examination of Syrian Kurdish cooperation with co-ethnic violent 
Kurdish groups in neighboring countries will be based on general reactions to and support of 
Syrian Kurds from these groups. 
5.3 Kurds from Iraq
Approximately 3.7 million Iraqi Kurds live in Northern Iraq and one to two million 
Kurds live in other part of Iraq (O’Leary 2002). After WWI, Iraq became a British mandate. The 
League of Nations gave some flexibility to minorities and guaranteed the respect of Kurds in Iraq 
(Edmonds 1971, 92). However, Britain forced its mandate and in order to stop resistance the 
British army did not hesitate to use violence. In 1930, British troops killed dozens in the city of 
Sulaimaniah to quell Kurdish protests. In the 1940s, the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish 
state was supported by Soviets. However, the Soviets withdrew after nine months in exchange 
for access to Iranian oil. This event temporarily ceased Kurdish movements in Iraq (McKiernan 
2006). 
In 1946, Iraqi Kurds formed the Kurdish Democratic Parties (KDP) by a tribal and leftist 
nationalist leader called Mustafa Barzani. He was a military leader in 1946 for the Kurdish 
Republic in Iran. KDP’s framework spread to Syria and Turkey shortly thereafter. Each aimed 
for autonomy and democracy for its respective part of country (Hassanpour 1994). Suppression 
and display of force lead to a war in 1961. The brutality of the Iraqi government’s operations led 
to unification and solidarity among Kurdish people, causing a national uprising. The war 
continued until 1970.  In 1974, the KDP declared a Kurdish autonomous region and started the 
war with the Iraqi Government.  However, in 1975 Iran and the U.S ceased their support of the 
KDP, which lead Barzani (leader of the KDP) to declare the end of the armed struggle. Many 
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peshmergas (around 100,000 to 200,000) then fled to Iran. The leftists and the KTL claimed that 
the KDP was unable to establish a successful movement. Leftist and Marxist ideologies also 
influence the group to create the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975 (Stansfield 2003 
and Hassanpour 1994) and Talabani became the most influential and dominant leader for the 
PUK. These two groups also different linguistically. PUK members largely speak Sorani whereas 
KDP members speak Kurmanci (Gunter 1998).  The KDP controlled the Dohuk region whereas 
the PUK controlled Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyya, which together comprises about 75 percent 
of the Iraqi Kurdish population (Hassanpour 1994). 
After 1975, there was a great oppression against the Kurds. During the Iraq-Iran war,
both countries tried to use the Kurdish populations of both countries in their favor against the 
opponent (McKeirnan 2006 and Hassanpour 1994). The ideological and political outlook caused 
conflict between the PUK and the KDP (Natali 2010 and Hassanpour 1994). Iran was able to 
push both parties to establish the Kurdistan Front in 1987 just before the Anfal genocide. Both 
parties acted together against the Iraqi government. Later, Western countries got involved and 
created a “safe haven” which transformed the Kurdish Regional Government. After the civil war 
in 1994-98 between the PUK and the KDP, they started to run the joint government together
(Hassanpour 1994).   
5.4 Kurds from Iran
In Iran Kurds are considered “a branch of the Iranian race”. Since Iran has a multiracial 
mosaic they believe Kurds are part of Iran, therefore there is no Kurdish problem (Edmonds 
1971, 99). Iranian Kurds number about seven percent of 68 million people (Marcus 2007). In 
Iran all languages, including Kurdish, are allowed to be used. In spite of these open conditions, 
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events between 1918-22 and 1941-46 suggest that Kurds have faced persecution and 
imprisonment for certain activities (Edmonds 1971, 99). Furthermore, the majority of Iranian 
Kurds are Sunni Muslims and they have been discriminated by the Shi’a population in Iran 
(Gunter 2003). Iranian Kurds established a Kurdish state in the city of Mahabad in 1946 with the 
help of the Soviet Union. Many Iraqi Kurds also played an active role in governing and in the 
military; Mustafa Barzani became the military leader in the Kurdish state (Nassanpour 1994). 
The Kurdish state ended less than a year after the Soviet Union’s withdrawal (Iranian Kurdistan 
2008). 
The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was established in 1945. The party aimed 
for autonomy for Iranian Kurds and the use of the Kurdish language in school and 
administration. However, Kurdish rebels were crushed in 1966 and 1967. The reestablishment of 
the party did not occur until 1973 (The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) 2000-2012 and 
Gunter 2003).  The Komala established itself during the Kurdish uprising between 1967-68. The 
Komala had leftist and Marxist ideologies and remained informal until the 1980s. The Komala’s 
ideas were far more ambitious than the ideas of the KDPI. The Komala’s actions increased due 
to the Iranian government capture of rebel areas in 1986 (Entessar 1992). The leader of the 
KDPI, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, was assassinated (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). Iranian Kurds 
(KDPI and Komala) supported the Iranian Revolution because they were suppressed and 
discriminated during the shah regime. Kurds were hoping that revolution would provide them a 
Kurdish autonomous rule. Nevertheless, Khomenini saw these claims as a threat to his newly 
established government (Gunter 2003).
Iran and Turkey claimed that the PJAK, a “moderate wing of the PKK”, was established 
and based in the Qandil Mountains in Northern Iraq (Gunter 2007 and Marcus 2007). The PJAK 
states that the organization was founded in 1997 by students who aim for peacefu
PJAK influenced by socialist revolutions of Russia and t
and the PKK nationalist movement. They tried to build a Kurdish national identity in Iran, 
however the Iranian government harassed the group considerabl
and members to move to Northern Iraq in 1999. 
of Mount Qandil (Brandon 2006)
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Figure 1 The Cooperation between the PKK, Syrian Kurds
Turkey (1984-1999)
The PKK was supported by foreign countries such as Russia, Syria, and Greece. To the 
extreme that Syria became a military base for the PKK (Yavuz and Gunter 2001). Both the 
Syrian Kurds and the Syrian government significantly helped the PKK. 
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sympathy and support. Some Syrian Kurds would fight with the PKK and profess “‘Ocalanism’, 
the ideology of the PKK chief” (McKeirnan 2006, 149). In the 1990s, Turkish intelligence 
estimated that 25 percent of PKK members were Syrian Kurds and that around 7,000 to 10,000
Syrian Kurds joined the PKK and did not come back to Syria (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). 
The Syrian government encouraged Syrian Kurds to join the PKK, which caused the 
group leader, Abdullah Ocalan, to condemn Syrian Kurds for their national struggle and even 
accept the Syrian government’s claim that “most Kurds originated outside Syria (Ahmed and 
Gunter 2007, 302). The PKK travelled inside Syria and collected money. The Kurdish Syrian 
students were very excited by the PKK and the idea of an independent Kurdish state.  Kurds in 
Syria were not politically active and state policies made it difficult for them to act against the
Syrian government. Moreover, some Syrian Kurds have relatives across the border in Turkey, 
which also motivates them to help the PKK. Syrian Kurdish support for the PKK was and is
“more tacit than overt” (Marcus 2007, 59). Even Syrian leaders sent their troops to fight against 
Kurdish uprising in Iraq. In fact, some Syrian-Kurdish families would send their sons to fight in 
Iraq and Iran (McKiernan 2006). Moreover, the Syrian government discriminated Kurds in every 
branch of government (Edmonds 1971).
The reason for the Syrian Kurds lack of military involvement in Syria in the battle for 
their rights has two explanations. Some believe “we have no mountains, so we cannot fight here” 
(McKeirnan 2006, 147-151). Some state that “no one wanted trouble with the [Syrian] 
government” (McKeirnan 2006, 147).  One PKK militant reports, “it was always clear we (the 
PKK) wouldn’t take any action that was against Syria. There was no decision. We just knew that 
we couldn’t do anything proper… that’s it” (Marcus 2007, 59). Moreover, even though, Iraqi 
Kurds have strong ties with Syria, the PUK and KDP have neither supported nor pressured the 
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Syrian government to improve rights for Syrian Kurds because the Syrian government supported 
the PUK (Gunter 2000). This position stems from the groups’ desire to avoid harming their 
relationship with Syria. 
In 1998, in order to end Kurdish violence, the Turkish state threatened to go to war with 
Syria if they did not expel the leader of the Kurdish movement, Ocalan, from the country (Yavuz 
2001). Also during this time, the U.S. helped Turkey against the PKK. The U.S. and Turkey 
pressured Syria to expel the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan (Gillis 2004). Egypt warned 
Syria that Turkey is not bluffing. Syria told Ocalan to leave the country and he complied in 1998. 
He was captured in 1999 with the help of CIA (Marcus 2007).Yet, the U.S. insisted that Turkey 
improve Kurdish citizens’ well being and peacefully solve the Kurdish problem (Gillis 2004). 
Nevertheless, the PKK still have strong ties with two of the parties and presently maintain some 
presence in northern Syria and some Syrian Kurds still fight with the PKK. After Ocalan’s arrest, 
the Syrian Government signed the Adana agreement. With this agreement, both countries 
decided to have common security politics. Syria banned the activities of the PKK and PYD (the 
Syrian Kurdish political party). The Syrian Government acknowledged that the PKK is a terrorist 
organization, arresting and returning its members to Turkey (Pacal 2012). 
Bashar Assad came to power in 2001 he also improved the political and economic 
dialogue with Turkey. They signed many economic and security agreements, including one “to 
jointly combat crime and terrorism” (Eligur 2006, 2). Between 2002 and 2003, “Turkey’s exports 
to Syria increased by 37 percent and trade between the two countries [grew] considerably, 
exceeding $800 million” (Eligur 2006, 2-3) In 2003, the Syrian government carried out military 
operations against the PKK along the Turkish border and turned captured PKK members over to 
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the Turkish government. Both countries also supported the territorial integrity of Iraq and shared 
the fear of an autonomous Kurdish state in Iraq (Eligur 2006). 
It is clear that the host state’s relation with the violent group was the main hypothesis as 
it explains the cooperation between Syrian Kurds and the PKK. The Syrian government had a 
good relationship with the PKK. Since Assad supported Kurdish rights in Turkey and had been 
helping the PKK, neither the PKK and Iraqi Kurds, nor Syrian Kurds wanted to upset the Syrian 
government. Moreover, Syrian Kurds were not punished or prosecuted if they helped the PKK. 
This absence of fear or pressure has allowed Syrian Kurds to help fellow Kurds (the PKK) in 
their fight for independence. Furthermore, the close ethnic ties between Syrian and Turkish 
Kurds also played an important role in facilitating co-ethnic group cooperation. My analysis
demonstrates that Turkey can pose considerable threat to any group or country if they help the 
PKK. Further, it also reveals that relationships can be reversed if any country or group 
cooperates with or helps the PKK. These incidents clarify that the Syrian state’s attitude towards 
the PKK or Iraqi violent ethnic groups impacts the level of cooperation among Kurdish group. 
Furthermore, the PKK and Iraqi Kurdish groups try to avoid upsetting their relationship with 
Syria due to the support they receive for their activities, even if that means not supporting – and 
in some cases, discouraging - Syrian Kurds’ demand for autonomy and any activities carried out 
by Syrian Kurds against the Syrian government. 
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6.2 Iraqi Kurds 
Table 2 Timeline for Iraqi Kurdish Groups’ Activities
Years Groups’ Activities Neighboring States
1946 1946 The KDP Established in Iraq
1975 The PUK created by Talabani in Iraq
1983-88 The PKK and KDP signed Principles of 
Solidarity 
The treaty of Principles of Solidarity Ended 
(1988)
1989 The PUK and PKK signed Protocol of 
Understanding (ended within a year)
1988 -93 The KDP and PUK Cooperated against 
Saddam
1994 -98 Civil War between  the PUK and KDP
                                                 
The PUK and KDP  Signed a Peace Treaty 
(1998)
The PUK and Iran cooperated 
against the KDP (1996)
The KDP cooperated with Saddam 
Hussein against PUK (1996)
Turkish Forces and the KDP 
against PUK and PKK (1995-97)                                         
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2005  The PUK and KDP signed the Strategic 
Agreement
Note: The information gathered from MAR (2010), Olson (1996), Emin (2012). 
6.2.1 Iraqi Kurds and Turkish Kurds (1983-1989)
6.2.1.1 Principles of Solidarity and Protocol of Understanding 
Table 3 Cooperation between the PKK and Iraqi Kurds (the KDP and PUK) (1983-89)
Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish Groups The Agreement Years
The KDP / PKK Principles of Solidarity 1983-87
The PUK / PKK Protocol of Understanding 1988-88
In 1983, the PKK and the KDP signed an agreement called the “Principles of Solidarity”. 
These two groups agreed to commit themselves to protecting against all forms of imperialism. 
They also decided to cooperate with “other revolutionary forces in the region and [to create] new 
alliances” (Olson 1996, 51). The principles also: prohibit interference in internal affairs; express 
the PKK and KDP’s commitment to nonviolent interaction with one another; and declare that if 
one makes a mistake implementing its alliance and ignores a warning then the alliance will cease 
to exist. This agreement was honored for some time and the PKK began to move towards and 
establish their presence in northern Iraq, moving around easily (Olson 1996). 
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The Principles of Solidarity agreement was essential for the PKK to launch an attack 
against Turkey. Moreover, the PKK used Barzani’s relation with the Iranian government to 
travel Iran. However, the relationship started to change in 1985 (Marcus 2007. In response, 
Turkey deployed military operations in Northern Iraq. In 1983, the Turkish and Iraq 
governments signed a “Frontier Security and Cooperation Agreement” which allowed Turkey to 
enter 10 km to the Iraqi Territory with military operations (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011, 
Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008). The first operation took place in 1983, 
in which seven-thousand Turkish soldiers entered up to 5 km into Iraq. The second operation
occurred in October 1984 and targeted the PKK camps (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011). The 
Turkish military interventions in Northern Iraq against the PKK also destroyed Barzani’s bases 
and killed Iraqi Kurds. The KDP demanded the PKK to change their bases, however the PKK 
refused, later deciding to make some changes. This did not satisfy the Turkish government 
(Marcus 2007). The third operation occurred in August 1986 and Turkish troops killed 100 Iraqi 
Kurds and KDP members.  In the fourth operation, in March 1987, 30 Turkish fighter jets 
bombed PKK camps, killed many Iraqi Kurds, and destroyed many homes (Yirmi Altinci 
Operasyon 2011, Marcus 2007).  After two months, Barzani dismissed the agreement and 
argued, “after all that has happened, it is absolutely impossible for the PKK to stay in the areas 
under our control” (Marcus 2007, 105). Moreover, the PKK committed violent actions against 
the Iraqi Communist Party, which supports the KDP. Barzani interpreted this as an attack on his 
party (Marcus 2007). The violent PKK behavior against women and children and pressure from 
Turkey played an important role in ending the PKK and KDP alliance in 1987. Meanwhile, one 
year later, the PKK signed an agreement, called a “Protocol of Understanding”, with the PUK. It 
aimed for unity, cooperation and joint actions; however the leader of the PUK feared supporting 
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the PKK due to Turkey’s prior repeated military actions in Northern Iraq the PKK.  This 
agreement also ended within one year (Olson 1996). There were no Turkish operations in 
Northern Iraq between 1988 to 1991 (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011).
These events illustrate that Kurds established cooperation because of sense of Kurdish 
identity. Ethnicity obviously was the biggest reason for their cooperation. However, later, Iraqi 
Kurdish groups withdrew from their agreements with the PKK due to a number of Turkish 
military interventions in the Kurdish region of Iraq. Military threat becomes a big issue for 
groups. Turkey becomes a great threat to Kurdish cooperation. The Turkish government 
constantly bombed PKK camps and intervened militarily in Northern Iraq, causing Barzani and
Talabani, both set up in the region with their respective groups, to not cooperate with the PKK, 
out of fear of facing the same Turkish military action. Although Turkish forces were bombing 
the PKK camps, Iraqi Kurds also lost their lives and homes. Both the PUK and the KDP have 
also been targeted due to their cooperation with the PKK. During the groups’ cooperation, there 
were four Turkish military interventions in the Kurdish region between 1983 and 1987. 
Following the Iraqi Kurdish groups’ withdrawal from cooperation with the PKK, Turkey ended
its military operations in the Kurdish region of Iraq. This demonstrates that when the level of 
threat increases groups retract their assistance to other group(s). 
6.2.1.2 Safe Haven the Civil War between the PUK and KDP (1991-1997)
During the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republics of Iran and Iraq used Kurds as a tool to 
revolt against each other. As a result, the Iraqi government destroyed more than 4,000 Kurdish 
villages (McKeirnan 2006). Some even argue, “one-third of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan 
had been depopulated” (Olson 1992, 477). At the end of the war, the Iraqi government used its 
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own force, including the use of chemical weapons, against Iraqi Kurds. Some state that more 
than 100,000 Kurds were killed in the 1980s when the U.S. was still aiding the Iraqi government 
(Olson 1992 and McKeirnan 2006). In 1988, immediately after the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi 
government began the Anfal campaign, which was carried out genocide against Kurdish people. 
In spite of their different tactics and political ideas, the PUK and KDP worked together to control 
the Kurdish areas, which demonstrates that ideological differences can be overcome when there 
is a greater threat to both groups. However, Iraqi forces regained the territory back and many 
Kurds fled to the mountains of Turkey and Iran. A few U.S. senators suggested trade sanctions 
against Iraq, but were refused by the Reagan and Bush administrations.  Bush even gave away 
secret aid, close to $1 billion, to Iraq. Meanwhile, Kurds were not even able to have a meeting 
with “a lower U.S. official” (McKeirnan 2006, 49). 
The Gulf war changed the destiny of Iraqi Kurds. Security issues play an important for 
U.S.-Turkish relations. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Turkey had a strong bilateral 
relationship against the Soviet Union (Gillis 2004). The U.S. –Turkish relationship caused the 
U.S. to overlook Kurdish problems and suffering in Turkey. The U.S. government supported the 
military apparatus, which is seen as a “guardian of the state’s Turkish and secularist identity” 
(Charountaki 2011, 133). During the Gulf War, Turkey significantly helped the U.S. The U.S. 
was able to use Incirlik air base. Incirlik was essential to the U.S. mission. For that reason, the 
U.S. Military Command Center (MCC) and F-15 pilots from Incirlik were and are sharing 
information about PKK movements to Turkish intelligence, an interaction which forms a part of 
the MCC agreement. Turkey constantly warned the U.S. to keep Iraqi Kurds in line and 
encourage them to fight against the PKK. It is clear that the U.S. needed Turkish territory for the 
mission and Turkey used this as an opportunity to weaken the PKK (McKeirnan 2006). Iraqi 
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Kurds knew that the U.S. was the only country to protect them against Saddam therefore they 
had to obey all supposed obligations. There would have been a greater loss (risk of being
dismantled by Saddam Hussein) had Iraqi Kurds decided to cooperate with the PKK. In that 
case, neither the U.S. nor Turkey would have protected them against Saddam. Cooperating with 
the PKK would have not secured their lives because the PKK lacked the power and capabilities 
to protect their fellow Kurds. 
The Gulf war also resulted in creation by the U.S. and UN of the “Safe Haven”, located 
along the 36th parallel. The KDP and the PUK governed this safe haven zone together 
(Hassanpour 1994 and Freedom House 2002). Iran did not support a de facto autonomous 
Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, however Turkey was more eager due to the massive Kurdish 
population from Iraq. In turn, Turkey developed policies to have more influence on the KDP and 
PUK against the PKK (Olson 1992, Park 2003). During the 1990s, Turkey has used both military 
interventions and economical dependency of Iraqi Kurds to pressure them to fight against the 
PKK (McKeirnan 2006).
After establishment of the safe haven, Turkey started to play an important role for Iraqi 
Kurds. After the first Gulf war, the UN placed sanctions against the Iraqi government. Yet 
concurrently, the UN humanitarian program and U.S. humanitarian aid were established to help 
Iraqi people. Turkey played a key role in its establishment because Turkey was the only country 
that had control over the only open border-crossing point (Habur)6 into Iraqi Kurdistan passable 
to humanitarian aid operations. Both governments renewed this relationship every six months 
and the Turkish government’s approval was crucial (Natali 2010). Turkey pressured Western 
countries not to support or recognize Iraqi Kurdistan otherwise they would block humanitarian 
                                                          
6
The Habur was the only place where Iraqi Kurds could trade, averaging about $ 150,000 per day (Olson 1996).
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aid. Sometimes, they did not hesitate to close the border for humanitarian aid, causing food 
shortages and price increases. Illicit trading at the Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish border provided 85 
percent of the KRG’s revenues. The KRG also made around US $750 million from taxation at 
the Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish border (Natali 2010). Therefore, the survival of Iraqi people and Kurds 
depended both upon the aid that was provided by western countries and the profits generated 
from illicit trading. Therefore, it was unthinkable for Iraqi Kurds to cooperate with the PKK.  
Doing so would have lead Turkey to close its border, effectively ceasing both the humanitarian 
aid and illicit trading. For that reason, to maintain an open border, the KRG had a security 
agreement with Turkey, which incorporated searches for PKK activities and members along the 
border area (Natali 2010).
The Turkish military operation (fifth operation) occurred in April 1991. On September 11 
October 25, 1991 Turkey had two (six and seven) operations. During these two operations the 
KDP and YNK (Kurdish parties) helped Turkish forces (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011). Iraqi 
Kurds had a difficult time establishing their government due to Turkish military interventions. 
During these operations, Iraqi Kurdish homes and people also would get hit by air strikes. Iraqi 
Kurds interpreted these actions as a warning sign from Turkey to force the PKK to leave 
Northern Iraq. Otherwise they would be in danger (Marcus 2007). Military operations convinced 
Iraqi Kurds to help Turkey during the military procedures. In 1992, the PKK attacked the 
Turkish military, killing 23 soldiers and five village guards. Turkey – with support from Iraqi 
Kurdish fighters - responded by attacking the PKK. After two weeks, Talabani started to 
negotiate with the PKK, but Barzani wanted to force the PKK out of the Northern Iraqi border 
(Marcus 2007).  In spring 1992, Turkish forces held their eighth operation. In October 1992, 
Turkey deployed its ninth operation, involving with 15 thousand soldiers, tanks, helicopters, and 
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air force support. In April 1994, the Turkish government performed its 10th operation, this time 
with five-thousand soldiers. This time Turkey entered 15 km into Iraq. Turkey’s 11th operation
occurred in March 1995, utilizing 35 thousand soldiers, making it one of the largest military 
interventions in Northern Iraq (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011). 
During the civil war and operations with Turkey, KDP members would try to capture a 
female PKK member alive because they believed that women ought to be at home instead of in 
the field of battle. Moreover, some Kurdish Northern Iraqi ministers “resigned from local 
parliament to protest Iraqi Kurds aiding Turkey against their ‘brother Kurds’” (McKiernan 2006, 
74). This shows that fighting against the PKK was a big issue. Even though, Iraqi Kurds might 
not have wanted to help the PKK, they did not want to fight against their fellow Kurds either. 
This demonstrates that ethnic identities and ties play an important role in group attitudes and 
positions even if the groups fight against one another.  
During this time, the relationship between the Turkish government and Iraqi Kurds 
improved drastically (Olson 1996). Barzani stated “we consider relations with Turkey to be 
extremely vital” (Marcus 2007, 201). Talabani claimed that the PKK should reply optimistically 
to Ozal’s statement on Kurdish rights and stop armed violence and instead solve problems 
through dialogue. Talabani even stated “the Iraqi Kurds might want to be annexed by Turkey” 
(Olson 1996, 52). Ocalan claimed that Barzani and Talabani betrayed the PKK by cooperating 
with the Turkish government (Olson 1996). The Turkish government also tried to build a good 
relationship with Iraqi Kurds it would allow Turkey greater influence in Northern Iraq. Turkey 
forced both leaders to act against the PKK (Marcus 2007). Iraqi Kurds also understood that the 
benefit of helping or taking sides with Turkey was greater than cooperating with the PKK. 
Nevertheless, Iraqi Kurdish leaders tried to convince Turkey to solve the dispute through 
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dialogue which reveals that Iraqi Kurds were unwilling to use violence against the PKK and nor 
did they want Turkey to use violence against their fellow Kurds. 
Later, the PKK had to relocate their camps. Turkey wanted to establish a buffer zone,
however Iraqi Kurds refused.  They did not desire to arrange and provide a full-time border 
patrol to keep out the PKK along the Iraqi/Turkish border. After a short time, the PKK returned 
to their camps in Iraq. Iraqi Kurds ignored the action because they did not want to have another 
war with the PKK. They also believed that this would turn Turkey’s attention to solely focus on 
the PKK, removing their chance to undermine the Kurdish Regional Government. Furthermore, 
the KDP and PUK also had internal problems that demanded their attention (Marcus 2007).  
These drastic changes in circumstances, especially after the establishment of a safe haven 
and the Iraqi Kurds’ newfound economic dependence on Turkey, seem to have played an 
important role in chancing the attitude and relationship between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds. Turkey 
tried to use the economic dependence of Iraqi Kurds as leverage to force them to act against the 
PKK. Military interventions, which were not just harming the PKK but also Iraqi Kurds, were
another important reason for Iraqi Kurds to act against the PKK and force the PKK to relocate 
their camps. Nevertheless, the sense of ethnic ties made it difficult for some Iraqi Kurds to act 
against fellow Kurds. Even though fear may have been the cause for Iraqi Kurds to avoid helping 
the PKK, they did not want to fight against their fellow Kurds either.
6.2.1.3 The Civil War between the PUK and KDP (1991
Figure 2 Alliances for the KDP and PUK 
In the 1990s, the KDP and PUK worked together.  However
between these groups in 1994 due to land dispute and
2011). This allowed the PKK to use Iraq as a sanctuary from the Turkish army. The PKK used 
the territory that was mostly controlled
from which to fend off the KDP. The PKK and the PUK started to work together against KDP 
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committed betrayal. Nevertheless, Barzani ignored the claims because he needed to focus 
war with Talabani (Marcus 2007).
another group if they perceive cooperation 
The PKK wanted to use a territory controlled by the KDP
with the PKK in order to have gain more 
and a threat to its existence. The peace agreement between the PKK and the KDP was also 
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The US feared instability of region and shift the balance of powers. As a result, in 1995, 
it organized a meeting however, it could not solve the dispute. Later, The KDP also allied itself 
with the Turkish army and Iraqi government against the PKK and the PUK (Olson 1996 and 
McKeirnan 2006). The PUK got help from Iran. In return, the PUK allowed Iran to attack Iranian 
Kurds sheltering within its territory (Abdulla 2011). To strengthen its position and to retake Irbil 
from PUK, Barzani cooperated with Saddam. Barzani defended his act referring to the PUK 
agreement with Iran. Kurdish fronts were being both militarily and politically self-destructive 
(Olson 1996, Gunter 1998 and McKeirnan 2006). 
The civil war between the KDP and PUK illustrates that economical interest and gains 
can be extremely important reasons to act against each other. During the conflict, group interest
motivated groups to ally themselves with any government (such as the Iraqi government) to have 
leverage against other group. Cooperation between the PKK and PUK was also motivated by
groups’ gains and threat. The PUK allied itself with the PKK to have an advantage over the 
KDP. The KDP agreed to a ceasefire with the PKK, in order to be able to move effectively 
against the PUK. These events show that group cooperation is about group interest and gains. 
6.2.1.4 The Washington Agreement and Strategic Agreement
The large Turkish military intervention against the PKK in 1997 showed that the Iraqi 
Kurdish conflict would destroy the Kurdish regional government. Moreover, the US’s effort was 
also important in solving the groups’ dispute (Marcus 2007). The PUK and KDP signed the 
Washington Agreement in 1998. Both parties agreed to share power within Northern Iraq 
(Abdulrahman 2012). This agreement includes equal distribution of revenues from cross trading 
with Turkey and other countries and declares the removal of checkpoints, which allow Kurds to 
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move freely throughout the region. Nevertheless, the disagreement “over the composition of a 
regional government” continued until 2001. They were able to improve and cooperate on issues 
such as “security, demilitarization, the return of displaced people, and other issues” (Freedom 
House 2002).
The Washington agreement, Drogheda, guaranteed the security of Turkey, with the KDP 
policing the borders, and also constrained the PKK’s ability to mobilize themselves within 
Turkish-Iraqi borders. The U.S. government’s involvement is also essential in this agreement 
(Olson 1996). With the agreement, the U.S. tried to protect Turkey. It gives us a clear indication 
that the PUK and KDP had to take a side with the U.S. in order to establish the Kurdish regional 
government (the KRG). Later developments show that KDP members tried to align themselves 
with Turkey against the PKK.  In 1995, some of them even, for the first time, referred to the 
PKK as a terrorist organization on Turkish television. However, some KDP members felt guilty 
for fighting against the PKK and their close relationship and collaboration with Turkey has also 
been seen as a betrayal of Kurds in Turkey (Olson 1996). The PKK and the KDP decided to sign 
a ceasefire in 1995 (Kirisci and Winrow 1997).
The US’s role was essential to establish peace between the PUK and KDP. Moreover, 
Iraqi Kurdish interest, which is the survival of the KRG, motivated both groups to sign the 
Washington agreement and later the strategic alliance agreement. The US invasion of Iraq also 
stopped neighboring countries (Turkey and Iran) from military intervention in Northern Iraq 
against the PKK and PJAK. The absence of fear from neighboring countries resulted in a neutral 
relationship between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK and PJAK. One reason for the non-cooperation 
between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK might be US’s disallowance of cooperation. The US would not 
want to upset its relationship with Turkey.   
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The Washington agreement created a two-headed government. Sulaymaniyah governed 
by the PUK and Erbil and Dohuk ruled by the KDP. However, after the invasion of Iraq, Kurdish 
groups decided to transform themselves into a “strategic alliance” in 2005 due to the change in 
balance of power in Iraq and in the region7. The competition and conflict between two groups 
could have harmed Iraqi Kurds’ interest, which may even result in the risk of losing Erbil, Dohuk 
and Sulaymaniyah. The Strategic Alliance was about power sharing in Northern Iraq that
established a one-headed government. The agreement had many great advantages for both 
groups such as solving the leadership dispute between Talabani and Barzani, carrying out
Kurdish demands, and increasing the regional activities (Semin 2012). The cooperation between 
the PUK and KDP began when both groups perceived the benefit of collaboration to the future of 
Iraqi Kurds. However, they also feared that if they did not cooperate, they would risk losing 
regional independence. Therefore, both groups saw the opportunity to benefit from cooperation 
and feared losing their territorial control, a perceived benefit and fear that formed the 
foundations for group cooperation.  
When the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in 1999, many PKK fighters 
established their presence in Northern Iraq. Turkey used military intervention in order to capture 
PKK members during 2001. Both the PUK and KDP established a unified policy to expel the 
PKK members from Northern Iraq (Freedom House 2002). Military interventions likely
                                                          
7
The principles of the strategic alliance:
“1. Both of the parties will participate in the elections with a unified list, either nationally or provincially.
2. As part of the agreement, the assignment of duties in the KRG will be shared by the two parties (KDP-PUK) and both parties will support each 
others’ members in not only Erbil but also Baghdad. Moreover, the PUK and KDP parties will share power in the cabinet for four years, with 
each party holding the prime ministerial position and controlling the cabinet for two years each. Under exceptional circumstances, this two-year 
period can be extended to four years only if the two parties agree on an extension. For instance, northern Iraq’s President Nechirvan Barzani 
continued governing after his term ended upon the request of PUK leader Jelal Talabani”(Semin 2012).
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convinced Iraqi Kurds to act together against the PKK to avoid military interventions in their 
region. 
6.2.1.5 Relationship between Kurdish Groups after Invasion of Iraq
Table 4 Relationship between Turkey, the U.S. and the PKK, KDP, and PUK
(2003-2007) TURKEY The U.S.
The PKK Unhappy Neutral
The KDP Unhappy Happy
The PUK Unhappy Happy
The U.S. invasion of Iraq changed the lives of Iraqi Kurds. At first, Iraqi Kurds were very 
nervous about the U.S. invasion of Iraq because they worried that their autonomy might be at 
risk and feared that the U.S. would abandon them. On the other hand, the U.S. needed both 
Turkey and Iraqi Kurds on their side. Nevertheless, Kurdish and Turkish interests remained in 
conflict. Iraqi Kurds did not want the Turkish army in Northern Iraq and they stated that they 
would resist if should the Turks invade the territory. The U.S. also needed to reassure Turkey of 
a unified Iraq. However, the U.S. failed in this endeavor, which led the Turkish government to 
reject U.S. military use of Turkish territory for operations during the Iraq war (Park 2003). In 
2003, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated when the U.S. arrested 11 Turkish 
military personnel while operating in Northern Iraq. Turkish people viewed this as a source of 
humiliation (Gillis 2004). The relationship has taken different shape since 2006. 
In 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul signed a 
Shared Vision Statement to highlight the common values and goals between the two countries 
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(U.S. Department of State 2011).  In 2007, Turkish forces moved to the northern Iraqi border, 
which alarmed Barzani, who warned that Iraqi Kurds would also carry out attacks in Turkey8. 
The Turkish government instigated a major incursion into the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. 
The U.S. government stepped in and agreed to establish a location to share intelligence on the 
PKK’s whereabouts. Turkey agreed “to limit its intervention to air strikes and brief incursions” 
(Katzman 2009, 10). In June 2007, Turkey shelling against the PKK demolished some villages in 
the Governorate of Erbil (Governorate Assessment Report Erbil Governorate 2007). Turkey 
continued bombing the border areas between 2008 and 2009 (UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for 
Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers 2009). This demonstrates 
that Turkey’s interventions into the Kurdish region have been a great threat to Iraqi Kurds. The 
U.S. plays an important role, which tries to find a balance between the two without harming U.S. 
interest in Iraq and without upsetting Iraqi Kurds and their relationship with Turkey. 
During and after invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Kurds significantly helped the U.S. The U.S. 
government used Kurdish military and political forces to stabilize Iraq. In return, the U.S. 
removed UN sanctions and any internal or external embargo against the Kurdish region. In 2005, 
the Iraqi constitution gave “the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) recognition, rights, and 
revenues as a distinct political entity” (Natali 2010, 80).  The U.S has supported the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) due to the need for Iraqi Kurds to stabilize Iraq, however their 
policies have been influenced by the Turkish fear of an increase in PKK insurgencies within 
Turkey. The KRG needs U.S. support for its survival; therefore, they try to avoid any action 
against U.S. interest in the region. 
                                                          
8
Before invasion of Iraq, In August of 2000, Turkish air forces bombed the region between Lolan and Xakurk the primary 
location of PKK camps (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011). Nevertheless, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the military interventions 
stopped (until 2007) because Turkey was forcing the KRG to take action against the PKK and persuade the U.S. to defeat the 
PKK.
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In 2007, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdogan, visited U.S. President George W. Bush in 
the white house. Bush agreed to help Turkey against the PKK, which he viewed as a “common 
enemy” of Turkey, the U.S., and Iraq. Both countries agreed to act together against the PKK. In 
the proposed relationship, the U.S. would share operational intelligence as well as help Turkey to 
capture PKK leaders, research the PKK camps, and cease its logistic support to the PKK (Turkey 
and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008). Bush restated his commitment during Turkish 
President Gul’s visit in 2008. Since then Turkey has allowed the U.S. to use Incirlik Air base for 
the transport of non-lethal cargo to Iraq (U.S. Department of State 2011). Their differences over 
the Iraq war brought relations between Turkey and the U.S to one of the lowest points in decades 
(Gillis 2004). President Barack Obama’s historical visit to Turkey in 2009 was the first bilateral 
visit of his presidency.  He highlighted that the U.S.-Turkish relationship is based on mutual 
interests and mutual respect. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has also prioritized the U.S.-
Turkey relationship, and included a stop in Turkey on her first European trip (U.S. Department 
of State 2011). In 2009, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Iraq to form a positive
relation with the Iraqi government and the KRG. He insisted that the KRG “take a clear position” 
against the PKK. The Prime Minister of the KRG, Nechirvan Barzani, restated that they would
not permit the PKK to use their territory and added that the Turkish Government should provide 
general amnesty for PKK members (UNHCR Eligibility Guideliness for Assessing the 
International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers 2009, 94). The recent visit to Turkey, in 
December 2011, of U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, gives us better understanding of the U.S. 
Turkish relationship. In their meeting, President Gul told Biden that if the PKK does not stop its 
attacks then Turkey will have large intervention to Northern Iraq. In so declaring, Gul clearly 
threatens not just the PKK but also the Kurdish Regional Government if they don’t block or 
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narrow the field of activities of the PKK in Northern Iraq. Biden also agreed to increase controls 
on various measures in Northern Iraq to stop PKK activities (Kemal 2011). These affairs clarify
that both the US and Turkey have been forcing the KRG to against the PKK. If Iraqi Kurds do 
not stop the PKK attacks then Turkey seems to suggest that they will use military intervention, 
effectively undermining the KRG government. 
Turkey did not use military interventions against the PKK until 2008 because 
interventions could have caused instability in Iraq, which would anger the US. Moreover, the 
PUK and KDP did not act against the PKK because they were helping the US troops fight 
against insurgencies in Iraq. These events demonstrate that the Iraqi invasion led the PKK to 
have more territorial independence, which caused Turkey to restrain actions against the PKK 
(Shifrinso 2006). Nevertheless, after the relationship between the US and Turkey improved, both 
parties agreed to act together against the PKK. In order to pressure the KRG to act on Turkey’s 
behalf against the PKK, in January 2008, Turkey used four more air strikes against them (Turkey 
and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008). One month later, Turkey carried out its 25th
operation in Northern Iraq, deploying 3 thousand Turkish commandos along with other military 
backing. However, the U.S. reaction led Turkish forces to withdraw from Northern Iraq (Yirmi 
Altinci Operasyon 2011). In August 2011, Turkish planes killed seven Iraqi civilians, however 
they denied the accusation (Iran/Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan  2011). In 
October 2011, Turkey performed its 26th operation. 10 thousand soldiers and air forces operated 
in five different places in Northern Iraq: Avasin- Basyan (8 km further from Turkish territory), 
Zap (13 km) and Xakurk (17 km) (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011). In November 2011, the U.S. 
installed Predator drones from Iraqi to Turkey in order to support anti-PKK actions. The U.S. 
government also decided to sell three AH-1 Super Cobra helicopters to Turkey (Iran/Turkey: 
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Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan  2011). Iraqi Kurds still do not have much choice but to 
cooperate with the Turkish government in order to stop Turkish military interventions in their 
region.
Since the invasion of Iraq, Turkey has increased trading with the KRG. The average trade 
volume is about $ 5 billion per year. Around $ 1.5 billion to $ 2.6 billion of trade is on 
construction and contracting services (Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008, 
Bhadrakumar 2007, Natali 2010).  Energy cooperation with Northern Iraq also is growing. Iraqi 
government allowed the KRD to administer its oil wealth. Business interests in Northern Iraq 
have also increased with this new change. Turkish businessmen have been forcing Prime 
Minister Erdogan to have direct talks with the KRG. Turkish businesses are making an 
investment close to $15 billion in the next period (Bhadrakumar 2007). About 80 percent of 
goods sold in Northern Iraq that has bought from Turkey, which reveals that Iraq mostly imports 
from Turkey. Some argue that around 55% of the foreign companies in the KRG are from 
Turkey, primarily comprising road construction, two airports, a policy department, and general 
construction works. The military incursion in 2007 decreased the number of Turkish companies 
in northern Iraq from 142 to 52 in 2008 (Fielding-Smith 2010). Nevertheless, this did not stop 
future investment in the region. Indeed, in 2009, around 250 Turkish companies were active in 
Erbil. In Sulaymaniyah, 500 current companies are Turkish and Iranian. Turkish companies have 
the largest investment in the construction market, controlling almost 95 percent. Turkey also 
imports the majority of food and consumer items. The KRG also depended on Turkey’s help for 
additional electricity demands (Natali 2010).
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Table 5 Turkey’s Exports to Iraq by Sectors (2010)
Turkey's Exports to Iraq 2010 USD %
Iron and Steel 712,130,03211 .8%
Electrical Mach. Appar. 508,474,5308. 4%
Cereals, Cereal Preprtns. 501,278,2498. 3%
Non-Metal. Mineral Manfct. 425,350,2897. 0%
Metals Manufactures 370,272,8676. 1%




Furniture, Bedding, etc. 206,854,6983. 4%
General Industl. Mach. 183,189,6853. 0%
Paper, Paperboard, etc. 173,884,4352. 9%
Clothing and Accessories 173,362,3582. 9%
Textile Yarn, Fabric, etc. 173,206,2492. 9%
Dairy Products, Bird Eggs 155,568,1802. 6%
Essentl. Oils, Perfume, etc. 145,175,8072. 4%
Plastic, Non-Primary Form 135,355,2122. 2%
Meat and Meat Preparation 135,153,6022. 2%
Road Vehicles 121,546,1132. 0%
Petroleum, Petr. Products 128,782,0782. 1%




Note: Adopted from Tepav (Turkiye Economi Politikalari Arastirma Vakfi) 2011.
From the table we can see that trading with Turkey has played an important role in the 
socioeconomic life of the KRG. This rapid development and change will likely continue in the 
future (Kalkan 2011).  
Since Turkey has been seen as a rising power and influential country in the region it is 
becoming a more important ally for the U.S. Making it therefore vital for the U.S. to strengthen 
the relationship (Gillis 2004). The high number of interventions in Northern Iraq suggests that 
Turkey is a constant external threat to Kurdish cooperation because the Northern Iraqi 
government is afraid to cooperate and support the PKK out of fear of Turkey’s violent behavior. 
In some operations Iraqi Kurds have even cooperated with the Turkish government to stop 
Turkish interventions in their region. For that reason, the U.S. and Iraqi Kurds are providing all 
possible help and support to Turkey against the PKK. Moreover, the KRG developed multi-
million dollar cross-regional trading with neighboring countries, especially with Turkey, 
resulting in interdependence between these countries. Turkey and Iran also are also extremely 
important for the landlocked Kurdish region. Either closing these borders or involving itself in 
cross-border military intervention can cause large financial losses to the KRG. Therefore, the 
KRG has changed its policies toward the PKK and PJAK and - to maintain a good relationship 
with Turkey and Iran - they may do more in the future to also guarantee a possible trade zone for 
international businesses, export and import goods, and gain from possible pipeline revenues 
(Natali 2010, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008).
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6.2.1.6 Relationship between Turkish Government and the KRG
After the invasion of Iraq, Turkey believed that aggressive policies toward the KRG 
would prevent them from protecting the PKK. In order to ensure that ability, they isolated the 
KRG diplomatically and economically, effectively maintaining a weak KRG. However, the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) employed a different approach during their still-existing 
10 years of governance. They believe that in order to prevent the PKK attacks they should 
persuade the KRG to ensure that Turkey has stronger political, diplomatic and economical ties 
with the KRG. In 2007 and 2008, Turkey used “a carrot and stick” approach to force the KRG to 
work against the PKK. Turkey threatened the KRG with an economic embargo and military 
intervention in Northern Iraq if they continued protecting and sheltering the PKK. In contrast, 
Turkey has promised the KRG diplomatic, political and economical relations if they cooperate in 
the counter-PKK operation (Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008).
In 2008, the withdrawal of Turkish troops warmed the relationship. Nechirvan Barzani, 
the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), endorsed the Turkish action.  
He stated that military actions block the dialogue between the PKK and Turkey. He emphasized 
diplomatic solutions. The Prime Minister of Iraq, Barzani, also stated that before the Turkish 
intervention, both the Iraqi government and the KRG tried different methods to constrain PKK 
actions (Prime Minister Barzani commends Turkey's troop withdrawal 2008). 
The first high-level talks with Turkey did not start until May 2008. The talk was between 
the KRG Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani, “…and senior advisor to Turkish Prime Minister,
Murat Özçelik, the Special Coordinator for Iraqi Affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry; and
Derya Kanbay, Turkey's Ambassador in Baghdad” (KRG Statement on first High-level Talks 
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with Turkey 2008, 1). The meeting was about security, and political and economical issues 
between the Turkish Government, and the KRG. Nechirvan Barzani highlights that the KRG 
understands Turkey’s concerns and states that the problems can be solved through political 
dialogue (KRG Statement on first High-level Talks with Turkey 2008).
In April 2008, Foreign Minister of Turkey stated that they are ready to have a dialogue 
with the KRG, which had called for talks for some time. The KRG’s Head of Foreign Relations 
declared their satisfaction that Turkey desires to cooperate and talk with the KRG. This dialogue 
will solve the concerns that military action is not the solution to create a stable border (KRG 
welcomes talks with Turkey 2008). In 2009, Barzani also praised Turkey’s attempts to have a 
dialogue with Kurds in his interview with CNN. He also emphasized that the KRG never 
supported violent actions and that dialogue is the only option. Furthermore, Barzani stated that 
the relationship between the KRG and Turkey should not be bound to the PKK’s violence. Iraqi 
Kurds are not responsible for the violent actions of the group. He lastly stated that a solution to 
the problem would be a positive outcome (President Barzani praises Turkey's Efforts to engage 
with Kurds 2009). This indicates that the KRG and Kurdish leaders wanted to reach a peaceful 
solution and that they both stressed that military interventions are not a viable option. Both the 
KRG and Kurdish leaders also highlight that they do not support or help the PKK’s violent 
actions. Moreover, these statements reveal that the KRG is eager to develop a close relationship 
with Turkey.
When the PKK extended the ceasefire with Turkey, the Prime Minister of the KRG was 
pleased and believed that the ceasefire would bring stability and peace to the region (Prime 
Minister Barzani welcomes Extension of PKK Ceasefire 2009). The first historical visit comes 
with the Turkish foreign minister’s visit to the KRG on October 2009. President Barzani 
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declared that Turkey is an important country for Iraq’s development. Later, Turkey announced 
that they will open a Consulate General in Erbil, the KRG capitol. During the visit, Turkey 
signed 48 agreements of cooperation with the Iraqi government. The Turkish foreign minister 
stated that these agreements also pertain to the KRG (President Barzani, Turkey's Foreign 
Minister Davutoğlu hold historic meetings, announce plans to open consulate 2009). This is an 
important development for the KRG because Turkey’s decision to open a Turkish Consulate 
General demonstrates that is Turkey willing to have a closer relationship with the KRG. 
Moreover, Turkey is aware of the potential of Northern Iraq to “…serve as a gateway to Iraq” 
and Iraq and Iraqi Kurds concurrently see Turkey as a gateway to west. However, some started to 
wonder if Turkey would continue referring the KRG as “northern Iraq” or if they would formally 
recognize the KRG. The KRG's head of foreign relations stated “the KRG do not make the issue 
of the name 'Kurdistan' a problem. The essence is more important than the name. The opening of 
the consulate shows how far we have come” (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2010, 1). Obviously, the KRG 
is trying to develop a close relationship with Turkey and Kurdish officials believe that Turkey 
will eventually officially accept the KRG. 
Another historical event came in the form of president Barzani’s visit with Prime 
Minister Erdogan, the Foreign Minister, and the Minister of the Interior of Turkey. All of the 
officials were pleased with the visit, believing that it will build broader relations for the coming 
years. During the meeting, economic issues and democratic opening of Turkey were discussed 
(President Barzani Wraps up Historic Trip to Turkey 2010).  A further achievement was a 
Turkey-Kurdistan Region Economic Forum. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Trade and over 
two-hundred Turkish business agents also attended. Both governments agreed to begin a free 
trade zone, opening Turkish banks and permitting Turkish airlines to fly to KRG’s capitol, Erbil 
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(Turkey’s Foreign Trade Minister participates in Erbil Economic Forum 2010). These are also 
huge steps for KRG economical development.
Other small meetings involved the Turkish Interior Minister in 2010 and the 
Undersecretary of Foreign Ministry of Turkey in 2011. The first meeting focused on security 
conditions along the border areas. The second meeting revolved around economical and political 
issues (Turkey’s Interior Minister discusses security with President and Prime Minister in Erbil 
2010 and Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary meets President Barzani and PM Salih 2011). 
These and other meetings demonstrate that economical and security issues are the two important 
factors determining the relationship between Turkey and the KRG. 
But the most important visit happened in 2011 when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan visited the Kurdish Region. He is the first Turkish premier to visit the KRG. During his 
visit he opened the Erbil International Airport and the Turkish Consulate in Erbil.  These are also 
two essential steps for the economical and political relationship. The KRG’s Head of Foreign 
Relations stated “With this historic visit, we are entering a new phase in our relations with 
Turkey. We are optimistic because it paves the way for greater cooperation between Turkey and 
the Kurdistan Region as well as all of Iraq” (President Barzani and Prime Minister Erdogan open 
Erbil International Airport and Turkish Consulate 2011). These statements summarize how the 
relationship and cooperation between governments is becoming very significant. 
After the PKK attack in October 2011, which killed 24 Turkish soldiers, Barzani 
condemned the attack and stated “this action is first and foremost against the interests of the 
people of Kurdistan” and claimed that it targets the Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood (Hedefi Türk-
Kürt Kardeşliği 2011 and Kurdistan Region Presidency Strongly Condemns Violent Attack in 
60
Turkey 2011). After the attack, the KRG decided to evacuate the villages near the border to 
avoid civilian harm (Hedefi Türk-Kürt Kardeşliği 2011). In November 2011, Barzani visited 
Turkey. The reason for the visit was security. Barzani declared that Turkish and KRG security 
depend upon one another. During the meeting, they discussed the status of the Turkish troops 
stationed in Iraq since 1996. Barzani agreed to allow the Turkish government to stay in Northern 
Iraq for six years more. With the strategic locations of the PKK, the Hakurk, Zap, and Qandil 
Mountain, Turkey wanted to establish a new base in order to prevent attacks. Barzani seems to 
have agreed that Turkey could open a new base. Nevertheless, Barzani emphasized that the 
military operations are not solutions and he offered the Turkish officials help to resume the 
negotiation dialogues between the PKK and the government (Asker Alti Yil daha Kuzey Iraq’ta 
2011). 
Turkish side was not satisfied with the Northern Iraqi government’s response. Prime 
Minister Erdogan stated that if Northern Iraq does not take actions against the PKK that Turkish 
armed forces will take action against the PKK. This is an open warning to Northern Iraq. 
However, the KRG do not want to fight against their follow Kurds. Barzani also believes in 
applying political instead of military pressure on the PKK to reach a solution (Bayram sonrasi: 
Sinir otesi mi Ateskes mi? 2011). Turkey seems to be pressuring the KRG to fight against the 
PKK. However, Barzani and the KRG also explicitly refuse military actions against the PKK. 
Recently, Barzani claims that they are forcing the PKK to cease its military actions and solve the 
problems through democratic means (Askin 2011). Talabani also declares that they persuaded 
the PKK but that the Turkish side only half-agreed with the terms that the PKK has been 
demanding (Silah Birakmasi icin PKK’yi ikna ettik 2011). It seems that Kurdish officials are 
playing the role of mediator between the PKK and the Turkish Government.
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Barzani’s visit to the White House and Turkey in April 2012 proved pivotal. Politicians 
in both meetings welcomed Barzani as a state leader. He stated that Iraqi Kurds seek peaceful 
solutions to the issues between the Turkish government and the PKK, reinforcing that violent 
means were useless and dangerous. If both sides arrive at peaceful methods then the KRG will 
help the process in any means. If the PKK insist on using guns then they (the PKK) will face the
consequences. Barzani’s most important remark was that the KRG will not allow the PKK to 
obtain their presence and use the KRG to attack Turkey. In so doing, Barzani for the first time 
indicated that they would not tolerate the PKK’s presence in their territory. He added that they 
still would not support or join any military operations against the PKK because he believes that 
military operations will not end the PKK (Ertan 2012, Yetkin 2012). Following both meetings, 
he revealed further insight into the fact that these issues were the focus of both meetings held in 
Ankara and Washington (Yetkin 2012). These events and remarks illustrate that Barzani is taking
a harder stance against the PKK. One reason for his tougher position is the U.S. government. 
Iraqi Kurds are willing to obtain their independence and they are aware that the U.S.’s role is 
crucial for their goal. In order to earn U.S. support, they support the U.S. foreign position 
against the PKK and Turkey. Thus, great powers can convince groups to either cooperate or not 
cooperate with their co-ethnic groups. Moreover, Iraqi Kurdish groups’ gains are greater if they 
obtain international support for their survival or group(s) goals. 
Journalist Hasan Cemal’s interviews with Barzani and Talabani in the 1990s reveal that 
Iraqi Kurdish position is not new. He states that from the 1990s through 2000, both Barzani and 
Talabani slammed the PKK and Turkey. However, they stated privately that there are limits to 
what can be done against the PKK and they added that Turkey needs to apply democratic 
reforms (Cemal 2012). As we see, the Iraqi Kurdish position did not change after the U.S. 
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invasion of Iraq. Turkey used aggressive policies toward the KRG, which will force them to 
cease protection of the PKK. Nevertheless, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) decided to 
take a different approach. They believe in order to prevent the PKK attacks they should persuade 
the KRG to ensure that Turkey should have stronger political, diplomatic and economical ties 
with the KRG. Turkey threatened the KRG with economic embargo and military intervention in 
Northern Iraq if they continue protecting and sheltering the PKK. The KRG supports Turkey in 
order to establish diplomatic, political and economical relations with Turkey. However, Iraqi 
officials and the KRG clearly refuse military actions against the PKK, instead forcing the PKK to 
stop its military actions and solve problems through democratic means. One reason for their 
refusal is that in the 1990s fighting against their Kurdish brother had left a sour taste; therefore, 
they do not want to repeat the same mistake. It seems that Kurdish officials are playing the role 
of mediator between the PKK and the Turkish Government.  This reveals that past experiences, 
in this case negative, resulted in a positive outcome for the groups’ relationships. Co-ethnic 
groups do not wish to repeat the same mistake twice.  Examination of Iranian Kurdish interaction 
with other Kurdish groups also reveals some variation, which leads to my last analysis. 
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6.3 Iranian Kurds
6.3.1 The KDPI and PJAK
Table 6 The KDPI and PJAK relationship with Iraqi Kurds and the PKK
The KDP The PUK The PKK
The KDPI Bad (1980-1999) Good (1980-1999) Neutral (1980-1999)
The PJAK Bad (2005-2012) Bad (2005-2012) Good (1999-2012)
The KDPI was the largest Iranian Kurdish opposition group demanding autonomy for
Iranian Kurds. The KDPI also used the Iraqi territory to launch attacks against the Islamic
government (Gunter 2003). Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980 gave leverage to Iraqi Kurds 
(especially the KDP) to form a good relationship with the Iranian government. Nevertheless, The 
PUK allied itself with the Iranian Kurdish KDPI, as they shared leftist ideologies (Marcus 2007). 
The armed struggle in Iraq also influenced and helped the resurgence of the KDPI in Iran. The 
Iranian government used Barzani’s influence over the KDPI which led Barzani to claim that 
Kurds in Iran should wait until the Iraqi KDP achieved its own autonomy. Tehran’s support of 
Barzani led him to discourage the Kurdish push to end anti-Iranian activism in Iran. Some 
listened to Barzani while others continued armed struggle. However, Iranian armed forces 
defeated the KDPI’s struggle with the help of Barzani, who closed the borders and led many 
Iranian Kurds to die (Hassanpour, 1994). There were minor conflicts between the KDP and 
KDPI. In one, Barzani helped Iran drive out KDPI members from strategic positions (Bruinessen 
1986). Barzani even returned KDPI members to the Iranian government (Gunter 2003). Some 
KDPI members stayed in Europe and Iraq until the end of the Pahlavi monarchy. Barzani did not 
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help Iranian Kurds due to financial support from the Iranian government (Hassanpour, 1994).
This demonstrates that Barzani performed a cost benefit analysis influenced by the Iranian 
government, which impacted his decision. He therefore decided to align his organization (the 
KDP) with Iran due to financial support from Iran (Ahmed and Gunter 2007).
There were also conflicts between the KDPI and Komala due to disagreement over 
control of certain districts in 1984 (Bruinessen 1986). For a few years, both sides lost significant 
power. The KDPI disbanded and weakened after the assignation of two leaders. The Komala 
basically became the only alternative to the KDPI. Nevertheless, the Komala also failed because 
it could not devote itself to either the national struggle or to the revolution. Both the KDPI and 
Komala established their political parties in Iran, demanding the independence of Iranian Kurds 
(Hassanpour 1994). The representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) in 
Britain, Loghman Ahmedi, states that the KDPI does not completely refuse violent actions unless 
it is in the interest of Iranian Kurds. Nevertheless, he adds that there are different methods and 
strategies available that will not result in the loss of human lives. He also states that one reason 
for their peaceful political struggle is that they do not want Iran to attack the KRG. The KRG’s 
security is extremely important for the KDPI. Ahmedi claims that the KDPI try to maintain a 
positive relationship with all Kurdish organizations, including the PKK. Nevertheless, they do 
not want any Kurdish party to dictate what action they must take. He states that they regularly 
meet with “Komala and other Kurdish Parties, however [they] do not have any relationship with 
PJAK” (Wilgenburg 2009). They try to distinguish and detach their party from PJAK because 
they want to avoid angering the Iranian government, thereby avoiding military actions against 
their party too.
65
The relationship between Iraqi Kurds and Iranian Kurds was influenced by group 
economic interest. Barzani did not want to damage the relationship with the Iranian government 
and did not want to lose Tehran’s financial support for its struggle. Fears of economic losses
motivated Barzani to act against the KDPI. However, it seems the relationship has changed
between Iraqi Kurds and the KDPI since the KDPI transformed itself into a political party. One 
of the KDPI’s objectives is to protect the KRG from military attacks. This demonstrates that 
ethnic ties play an important role for groups to avoid any action that would harm their co-ethnic 
groups. Nevertheless, the KDPI or other Iranian Kurdish political parties do not want to have any 
association with PJAK because they all fear the Iranian government. In this case, the threat from
the host state (Iran) is the essential cause preventing Iranian Kurdish groups’ cooperation. 
6.3.2 The PJAK and Cooperation with Other Co-ethnic Kurdish Groups
The PKK also did not want to involve itself with Iranian Kurds because of Iranian 
support to the PKK. Nevertheless, when Ocalan was captured in 1999 Iran ceased its financial 
aid. This changed the relationship between the PKK and Iranian Kurds. The PKK tried to earn 
Iranian Kurdish support and they succeeded in gaining the attention of some Iranian Kurds who 
were fed up with the Iranian regime (Marcus 2007). Iran and Turkey claimed that the PJAK, a 
“moderate wing of the PKK”, was established and based in the Qandil Mountains in Northern 
Iraq (Ahmed and Gunter 2007, and Marcus 2007). However, PJAK and the PKK use different 
sides of Qandil because of different military strategies (Timmerman 2007). Since 2005, PJAK 
has settled the PKK-based slopes of Mount Qandil. For that reason, they are controlled by the 
PKK. PJAK member, Rahman Ahmedi, states “the PKK does not need us. They have tens of 
thousands of fighters, and hundreds of thousands of sympathizers”. He admits “the PKK and 
PJAK cooperate to a certain degree if only to prevent clashes between their own fighters”
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(Timmerman 2007). Ahmedi wants to distance PJAK from the PKK because Turkey forced the 
U.S. to admit that PJAK was allied with the PKK. Association with the PKK decreases PJAK’s
credibility. Nevertheless, PJAK is thusly influenced by the PKK’s ideologies and Ocalan’s 
military strategies. This demonstrates that both Turkish and Iranian Kurds have close ties and 
that their relationship is cooperative. However, PJAK does not demand for an independent 
Kurdish state, but instead seek to replace the Iranian regime with a democratic rule. They also 
support the idea of self-rule for all groups in Iran (Brandon 2006).  PJAK and the PKK have a 
close relationship compared to other Iraqi or Irani Kurdish groups, a relationship founded upon 
their similar ideologies and military strategies. However, the biggest reason for the PKK to allow 
and help PJAK against Iran is the PKK’s lack of fear of losing economic gains from Iran. 
Cooperating with PJAK allowed the PKK to use, direct, and control PJAK members for certain 
ends. In this case, cooperation is more advantageous than non-cooperation. 
The PKK’s activities and Iranian and Turkish government use of military interventions in
Northern Iraq in order to stop PJAK and has been a great concern for Iraqi Kurds. The KRG did 
not want to damage the relationship with these countries because with them they have close 
economical ties. The KRG constantly ask both groups to lay down the arms struggle and to 
peacefully resolve their issues. (Marcus 2007). In 2008, the PKK and PJAK (Iranian violent 
Kurdish group) increased violent activity, causing the short-term closing of the Turkish and 
Iranian border and airspace. This event severely impacted the KRG’s economy, costing the 
Kurdish government around US $1 billion daily. The KRG countered and began closing PKK 
offices in the cities, blocking the routes to the Qandil Mountains (the base for the PKK camps), 
and campaigning against PKK actions. Sulaymaniyah officials also promised the Iranian 
government to take necessary actions against PJAK if they opened the borders again (Natali 
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2010). According to Natali (2010), in Sulaymaniyah, where Iran and the KRG “share three 
official and two unofficial border points…”, “…over half of 500 foreign companies… are 
Turkish and Iranian” (93-94). The KRG established a free-trade-zone with Iran, from whom they 
receive most of their electricity. In 2007, 60 percent of trade merchants in Sulaymaniyah
received $1 billion worth of goods from Iran.  More than 120 Iranian companies are established 
in the KRG and about 80 percent of these companies work in trading, food and housing in 
Sulaymaniyah. Iranian service providers built the Azman Tunnel in Sulaymaniyah, which aids 
Iran in the exportation of many construction materials, such as plastic, cement, and polyvinyl 
chloride, into Sulaymaniyah, (Natali 2010). This convinced the KRG to strategically cooperate 
with neighboring countries to guarantee “international recognition and open borders” (122). This 
shows that Turkey and Iran use the economical dependency of the KRG as leverage and, in some 
cases, as a threat to pressure Iraqi Kurds to act against the PKK and PJAK. The KRG will lose a 
great deal if they help their fellow Kurds. They find themselves in a position in which they do 
not want to bear the cost because there is only minimal gain (by helping co-ethnic groups) in 
return. The government of Sulaymaniyah guaranteed the Iranian government control of PJAK
activities if they reopen borders (Natali 2010). In January 2011, the Prime Minister of the KRG, 
Barham Salih, visited Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the Speaker of the Parliament, 
the Industry Minister, the Head of the National Security Council, and the foreign minister of 
Iran. The reason for his visit was to improve commercial relations and to increase growth in 
Sulaymaniyah (Prime Minister Salih meets Iran's President in official visit to Tehran 2011). This 
incident reveals that Iraqi Kurds economical development is essential to Iraqi Kurds and that 
neighboring countries play an important part. Therefore, they encourage the Iranian government 
to invest more to their region.
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The biggest fear and most damaging development for Iraqi Kurds have been military 
attacks in their region. In 2006, the Iranian government oppressed Kurds, causing Kurdish 
counterattacks. The killing of 10 Kurdish demonstrators led PJAK to respond with “three attacks 
against two Iranian bases”. Iran also responded with military operations near Mount Qandil, by 
crossing five kilometers into Iraq. They also bombed PKK locations. The director of the joint 
operation center at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense claimed that it was a mistake to have attacked 
the PKK instead of PJAK. Since then, the European Union and the US has recognized the PKK 
as a “terrorist organization”. The close ties between PJAK and the PKK prevented the US and 
the KRG from stopping Iranian military interventions into their territory (Brandon 2006). 
In August and September 2007, Iran used shelling against the PJAK, demolishing homes, 
villages and livestock in the Governorate of Erbil. Due to the heavy shelling, in September, 850 
families had to leave the areas (Governorate Assessment Report Erbil Governorate 2007). In 
2009, Iran bombed Northern Iraq, an action strongly condemned by the KRG government 
(Statement: KRG strongly condemns bombardment of border areas by Islamic Republic of Iran 
2009). In July 2011, Iran attacked PJAK. Turkey also used intense air fire and prepared for 
military intervention, which suggests that Iran and Turkey are cooperating to stop PKK and 
PJAK activities (Cavdar 2011). On July 13, 2011, reportedly 10,000 Iranian forces crossed the 
border and forced Iraqi Kurds to leave their homes and villages (Iraqi Kurds accuse Iran of 
illegal border crossing, 10,000 revolutionary guards cross the Iraqi border: Al-Rafedain 
TV 2011). In the beginning of July, Barzani condemned the attacks against Iran and stated that 
the attacks do not justify Iranian military attacks against the KRG, which impacts Irani and KRG 
relations. He states that the recent bombing of Iran was 76 km from the capital of Erbil and adds
"instead of instilling fear, they (the Iranians) would do better to try to resolve the issue through 
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dialogue and find workable solutions" (Iraqi Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani warns Iran 
over shelling 2011, 1). Barzani’s statement proves that Iran clearly threatens Iraqi Kurds and 
forces them to take actions against PJAK. 
On July 27, 2011, the KRG decided to position 12,000 peshmarga along the Iranian 
border, where Iran launched heavy attacks against PJAK and Iraqi Kurdish civilians. Salah 
Dilmani, a high-ranking Peshmarga officer stated, “we will confront any forces that may attempt 
to cross the borders of Kurdistan” (Iraqi Kurdistan deploys 12,000 Kurdish troops along the Iran 
border 2011). However, there have not been any clashes between Iraqi Kurds and any other 
Kurdish groups. Dilmani adds that Ansar al-Islam fighters (a militant Islamic Kurdish group) 
support and help Iranian forces (Iraqi Kurdistan deploys 12,000 Kurdish troops along the Iran 
border 2011). During this time, the British, U.S., and Iraqi governments ordered Iran and Turkey 
to end military actions against the KRG and respect Iraqi territorial sovereignty. They also 
advised the KRG to solve the dispute through dialogue (British parliamentarians voice concern 
about Iranian and Turkish bombardment of Kurdistan border 2011, Iraq says Iran’s shelling of 
Kurdish PJAK rebels damages ties 2011, and Iraqi Kurdistan deploys 12,000 Kurdish troops 
along the Iran border 2011). It is obvious that the international community is unhappy with 
military interventions, nonetheless they do not take actions to stop it. Moreover, ideological 
similarities (the case of Ansar al-Islam) play an important role in a group’s difficult decision to 
ally itself with a host state hostile to their co-ethnic groups. In other words, ideological 
similarities can be, sometimes, more important than ethnic ties for ethnic groups. Furthermore, 
military threat from neighboring countries forces groups to take protective actions to stop it. 
Nevertheless, this might be used strategically to prevent military interventions in their region 
because Iraqi Kurds did not stop nor fight with any group or country.  This illustrates that greater
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military threat sometimes motivates groups to avoid military intervention not just through
dialogue, but also through demonstrations of military strength. 
Between July and November 2011, 1,350 families (8,000 individuals) had to relocate,
dozens of homes were damaged, and ten villages were either fully or partially destroyed due to 
military attracts and shelling from Iran and Turkey. Mula Issa, a displaced resident, affirmed, 
“The PKK fighters do not use our villages. We thought before that Turkey was trying to make us 
all leave so they can have their war with the PKK anywhere they want. But after the most recent 
bombings [since early October], which have actually hit our houses, we feel they are now 
attacking us” (Iran/Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan  2011, 1). Iranian soldiers
would also attack farmers and kill their livestock, as observed and reported by Human Rights 
Watch in 2010-2011(Iraqi Kurdistan: Cross-Border Attacks Should Spare Iraqi Civilians 2011). In July 
2011, Iraq's Foreign Minister Hoshyar stated that Iran has been shelling Northern Iraq for over 
five years (Iraq says Iran shelling of Kurdish PJAK rebels damages ties 2011). According to the 
Middle East director of Human Rights Watch, Sarah Leah Whitson, “Iran may say it is
responding to armed attacks from Iraqi Kurdistan, but its own attacks, including indiscriminate 
use of rockets near civilian villages, are causing grave harm to civilians” (Iran/Turkey: Recent 
Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan  2011, 1). Since September 2011, a ceasefire between Iran and 
PJAK has decreased Iranian attacks against the KRG (Iran/Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi 
Kurdistan  2011). All these events show that the military threat is immense. Iraqi Kurds have 
already been harmed by military operations, therefore it is unthinkable for Iraqi Kurds to help 
their co-ethnic groups. They are aware that that would only increase the military threat and that 
this time they would face a military confrontation with neighboring countries. 
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Iraqi Kurds use dialogue and political means to solve issues with Iran and Turkey. In 
September 2011, Barzani stated that they are in a difficult position because Iran and Turkey are 
calling them to control the borders in order to avoid any problem. Nevertheless, “we are afraid to 
send forces to the borders for fear of a Kurdish-Kurdish war" and he adds “the PKK and the 
PJAK are not taking the situation in the Kurdish region into consideration… I call on the two 
sides to abandon the idea of achieving their rights via military means.” (Barzani calls on PKK, 
PJAK to end attacks from Iraqi soil, 2011, 1). Ethnic ties between Kurdish groups discourage
Iraqi Kurds to fight against their fellow Kurds from other regions. Moreover, the past experience
of Kurdish civil war between the PKK and Iraqi Kurds left both parties sour. They wish to avoid 
any further confrontation with other Kurdish groups.  However, they are under constant military 
threat from neighboring countries, which persuade against supporting the PKK and PJAK,
instead they seek to convince Kurdish groups to give up their arm struggle. 
Iran and the KRG government have attempted to improve their relationship. In October 
2011, Barzani had an official visit with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khomeini, President 
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, to discuss PJAK 
activities in Northern Iraq. The Iranian government therefore also began to display an increased 
focus on cooperation on not just security issues, but also on trade and cultural issues (Tol 2012). 
Salehi stated “there is a potential for increasing this volume ($ 4 billion) and we hope to be able 
to increase the level of exchanges through mutual cooperation” (FM for Further KRG Trade 
2011, 1 and President Barzani meets Supreme Leader Khomeini and President Ahmedinejad in 
Tehran 2011). The KRG is aware of the importance of a strong economic and military 
relationship with Iran.  
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My analysis shows that military threat was the main hypothesis explaining the non-
cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK and PJAK. As Barzani states, the KRG is in a 
difficult situation. Iran and Turkey use military power to overcome their ethnic problems and 
have no concern for the lives of Iraqi Kurdish civilians. One reason for their careless actions is to 
pressure Iraqi Kurds to avoid any affiliation with the PKK and PJAK. Iranian Kurdish groups 
(Komala and KDPI) have also tried to distance themselves from PJAK, so as to avoid 
punishment under Iranian law. Secondly, by military interventions to Northern Iraq, they force 
the KRG to take military actions against both Kurdish groups. 
Economical threat or pressure is the second hypothesis illustrating that the KRG needs its 
neighboring countries for its survival. Having a landlocked region enables Iraqi Kurds to act 
freely. The cooperation between the PKK and PJAK can be explained through cost and benefit 
analysis. The relationship between the two groups improved when Iran withdrew financial 
support to the PKK in 1999. Cooperation helped the PKK to hold influence over Iranian Kurds, 
which further increased their military advantage. Ideological similarities and ethnic ties between 
these two groups also played a crucial role in their cooperation. 
7. IN CONCLUSION
In this paper, I tried to address how co-ethnic groups react or respond when a member of 
the same ethnic group has an on-going ethnic conflict in a neighboring country. Under which 
circumstances do they or do they not cooperate? I examined the causal relationship between 
external pressure and non-cooperation through a structured comparative study of Kurdish ethnic 
groups, which include the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, the PKK) from 
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Turkey, the Kurdish Autonomous region in Iraq, PJAK (the Militant Party for Free of Kurdistan) 
from Iran, and Kurds from Syria between 1980-2012. 
My first hypothesis stated that groups will cooperate due to their ethnic ties, a hypothesis 
that revealed itself to be not as clear-cut as expected. It is generally believed that strong 
nationalism and ethnic ties would lead groups to cooperate. There are some examples of 
cooperation among Kurds due to their ethnic ties. For example, Syrian and Iranian Kurds were 
and are cooperating with the PKK. The cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and their co-ethnic 
groups (the PKK, PJAK, the KDPI, and Komala) is also not constant. In the early period, 
cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK was present due to ethnic ties. However my study 
shows that groups withdraw their support due to external factors. Groups decide to help their co-
ethnic groups if the cost of cooperation is lower, otherwise they will withdraw or tend to not 
cooperate in the first place. This suggests that ethnic identities have a great impact on co-ethnic 
group cooperation, while also suggesting that ethnic ties do not always guarantee cooperation.
My second hypothesis, that a host state’s relationship with a violent ethnic group impacts 
the level of cooperation among co-ethnic groups, revealed some empirical results. The good 
relationship between the PKK and the Syrian government convinces or makes it easy for Syrian 
Kurds to freely aid and join the PKK. However, when the nature of the relationship changes 
between two groups, so does their level of cooperation. In accordance, Syrian Kurds began 
receiving greater internal threats (punished under the law) from the Syrian government (due to 
their support for their co-ethnic violent group). This means that if a host state supports an ethnic 
violent group, then this will likely increase the level of cooperation among the same co-ethnic 
groups and ethnic violent group residing in the host state.
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Empirical analysis demonstrates that external threat, especially military threat, is the key
hypothesis explaining non-cooperation among co-ethnic groups. For Syrian Kurds, they did not 
have any external or internal threat demanding their non-cooperation with the PKK until 1999. In 
fact, they were even encouraged to cooperate by the Syrian government. However, later, military 
threat from Turkey forced Syria to take a different position. Syrian Kurds were punished if they 
aided the PKK, which decreased the level of cooperation between co-ethnic groups. 
The cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and their co-ethnic groups was and is greatly 
influenced by external threat. In the early period, cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK 
was present due to ethnic ties. However tactical differences and Turkish military interventions to 
Northern Iraq led the groups to dismiss agreements already in place. My study reveals the high 
number of interventions (29) in Northern Iraq, suggesting that Turkey is a constant external 
threat to Kurdish cooperation, naturally, as the Northern Iraqi government finds itself afraid to 
cooperate and support the PKK due to Turkey’s violent behavior. In some operations, Iraqi 
Kurds have even cooperated with the Turkish government to stop Turkish interventions in their 
region. The Iranian government also constantly bombed PJAK camps and intervened militarily 
in Northern Iraq, destroying, either fully or partially, more than ten Kurdish Iraqi villages. 
Barzani and Talabani feared non-cooperation with the PKK and PJAK, which would have 
increased the military threat and may have even led to a direct military confrontation with 
Turkey and Iran. 
Economical pressure or threat from neighboring countries also was and is an important 
component for non-group cooperation between co-ethnic groups. Iraqi Kurds have depended 
economically on neighboring countries (Iran and Turkey) for some time. Cross-border trading is 
essential for these groups because they are landlocked. Their survival depends on neighboring 
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countries. Due to their geographical isolation, groups strive to avoid conflict with their 
neighboring countries, even if it means not supporting their co-ethnic groups during armed 
conflict. In this scenario, an ethnic group performs a cost and benefit analysis. If they trade for 
great gain then they would prefer to cooperate with these countries rather than supporting violent 
ethnic groups. If they support violent ethnic groups, neighboring countries in the midst of an 
ongoing armed conflict can use economic dependence as leverage against state and the same 
ethnic groups in neighboring countries. The KRG developed multi-million dollar cross-regional 
trading with neighboring countries, especially Turkey, which has created interdependency 
between the two countries. Either closing these borders or involving itself with cross-border 
military intervention can cause large financial losses to the KRG. Turkey and Iran has used
closing borders in the past to pressure the KRG to act against the PKK and PJAK. In order to 
maintain a good relationship with Turkey and Iran, the KRD may do more in the future to 
guarantee a possible trade zone for international businesses, export and import goods, and gain 
from possible pipeline revenues.
Another crucial hypothesis that explains groups’ cooperation is the role of the great 
powers. The U.S. was the important external actor influencing cooperation among Kurds and 
was the key actor in peace negotiations between the KDP and the PUK in 1998. Nevertheless, 
the U.S. has discouraged Iraqi Kurds to cooperate with the PKK because Turkey plays a crucial 
role in U.S. policy. Bush and Obama agreed to help Turkey against the PKK, which they viewed 
as a “common enemy” of Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq. Both countries agreed to act together against 
the PKK. After the creation of a “safe haven” and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the KRG has 
required U.S. support for its survival. Therefore, they try to not act against U.S. interest in the 
region. Other Kurdish groups, such as PJAK and PKK seem to be less influenced by the U.S. 
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government than the KDP and PUK. Nevertheless, in the case of PJAK my study shows that the 
leaders and members of PJAK try to distance itself from the PKK to gain legitimacy and 
increased support from other countries. This shows that support of a great power is essential for a 
group struggle, leading group(s) to collaborate and avoid disturbing their state interest even if 
that means non-cooperation with co-ethnic group(s). 
The study demonstrates that ideological outlooks have little impact on non-cooperation 
among Kurdish groups. Groups do not fight over ideological differences, but similar ideologies 
make it easy for groups to cooperate and build good relationships. Ideological similarities helped 
Kurdish groups to establish close ties. For example, one reason for a good relationship between 
PJAK and the PKK, and the PKK and Syrian Kurds, is similarities in ideology. Syrian and 
Iranian Kurds both share or adopted the ideas of Ocalan. This also reveals that when groups 
work too closely with a larger and more established group they are more likely to adopt those 
ideas, helping to build a strong relation. 
Moreover, past experiences between ethnic groups have an impact, be it positive or 
negative, and influence ethnic groups’ perceptions of each other. Iraqi Kurds clearly refuse 
military actions against the PKK and PJAK, instead forcing them to stop their military actions 
and solve problems through democratic means. One reason for their refusal is that in the 1990’s 
fighting against their Kurdish brothers left a sour taste; therefore, they do not want to repeat the 
same mistake. It seems that Kurdish officials are playing the role of mediator between violent 
Kurdish groups and neighboring host countries, Turkey and Iran. The case study shows that 
negative past experiences had a positive impact on groups’ attitude for other groups. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that this will be the case for all cases. 
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Furthermore, my hypothesis, the competition for group leadership or for political and 
economical power (if there is more than one group) has also played a role in co-ethnic group 
cooperation. The civil war between the PUK and the KDP from 1994-1998 was fought over 
economic competition between the groups. Iraqi Kurdish groups seem to have more competition 
for resources. Both Iraqi Kurdish groups, the PKK and PJAK, have a clear leadership, which
suggests that there is no real competition for group leadership. Iraqi Kurds were divided into two 
groups and these two groups were controlling certain areas of Northern Iraq where they held a 
majority. However, the KDP and the PUK have long been competitive for resources. 
Nevertheless, since 2005, they have overcome this problem and have agreed to share resources 
and political power within the KRG. There are a few reasons for their decision. The first is that
the U.S. government encouraged both groups to cooperate during the Iraqi invasion to gain more 
leverage against insurgencies within the Iraqi Government. Secondly, both groups realized that 
the cost of not cooperating could diminish likelihood of the KRG’s survival. Clearly then, the 
groups considered cooperation more beneficial than detrimental, leading them to cooperate. This 
analysis suggests that competition for resources decreases group cooperation. However, once
groups decide how to share resources, cooperation becomes easy. 
My hypothesis can also be implemented in the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (the LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Tamils in India. Tamils are another ethnic group that 
lacks a homeland. They (both groups) live on different sides of the Palk Strait, allowing them to 
travel across the sea much more easily (Palanithurai and Mohanasundaram 1993). Tamils in 
India have more political and economical freedoms compared to Sri Lankan Tamils. Since 1983, 
Tamils in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu secretly supported the struggle of the LTTE. They gave 
moral support and provided them “facilities for training, arms, ammunition and communication 
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equipments” (Other Report on Japan and Korea; Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry Condemns Tamil 
Nadu Aid for Jaffna Tamils 1987). According to some sources, the LTTE has wide support from 
Tamil Nadu politicians, judges, police, and influential Tamil Nadu newspapers (Burns 1995).
Obviously, ethnic ties represent vital hypotheses that explain group cooperation among Tamils. 
Tamil Nadu has a great sympathy toward their co-ethnic group struggle in Sri-Lanka and 
supports them through various means. 
At first, the Indian government was silent regarding the activities of Tamils in Tamil 
Nadu and was supportive of the LTTE to gain political support in Tamil Nadu. Nevertheless, the 
Indian government withdrew its help to the LTTE when Indian military forces entered Sri Lanka 
to urge peace between the two.  Instead they fought against the LTTE and left after three years 
(Burns 1995). Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of India, also possessed an unfriendly attitude 
toward militants Tamils in Tamil Nadu. He arrested 1,000 militants based in Tamil Nadu, taking
their weapons and telecommunication equipment as well (Shelia 1987). When Tamil militants
killed the former prime minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, in 1991, Indian Tamils felt less 
compassionate toward the struggle of the LTTE (Indian lose sympathy for refugees, 1991).  One 
reason for their lack of compassion might be that after the assassination of Gandhi “police have 
unearthed arms and explosives caches, closed illicit weapons factories, unraveled smuggling 
rings and destroyed the Tiger's communications network in Tamil Nadu” (Chronology for Sri 
Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka 2004). These incidents might have caused fear among the Tamils in 
India to take side with the LTTE due to the consequences of being punished. The host state’s (in 
this case India) attitude played a crucial role for Tamil Nadu’s support of the LTTE. First, they 
were quiet, which suggests that they did not exercise any internal restraint of the activities. This 
allowed Tamil Nadu to more readily and freely support LTTE activities. Nevertheless, later 
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activities show that India has taken a different stance on the issue due to assassination of Gandhi.  
This hinders the support of Tamils in Tamil Nadu to help the LTTE. 
Since 1991, the Indian government has accepted the LTTE as a terrorist organization and 
has used military force against the organization, not just because of the assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi, but also because they perceive the LTTE as a threat to increase the power and
momentum of secessionist sentiment in Tamil Nadu. For that reason, the Sri Lankan government 
has resolved to find a political solution to the issue (India analyst criticizes southern leaders' 
support for Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers 2008). In the mid-1990s, with the help of pro-LTTE parties 
in the ruling coalition in India, the LTTE reestablished its network in Tamil Nadu. Even a top Sri 
Lankan army official acknowledged that “the LTTE is able to ferry some of its injured cadres 
to Tamil Nadu for treatment. There are also unconfirmed reports that some "outside" doctors 
(presumably from Tamil Nadu) are working in the LTTE based hospitals in the Wanni” 
(Balachanddran 1998). According to Pathmanathan, who holds position of the LTTE 
plenipotentiary for international relations, “We are grateful that the people of Tamil Nadu have
expressed so much solidarity with Eelam Tamils. These are true feelings of the people without 
any political or vested interests. It gives us solace to know that our brethren across the sea are 
one with us in our time of grief and sorrow. The sentiments and emotions poured out by the 
people of Tamil Nadu, and the cries of the Tamils in the island, are bound to reach the hearts of 
the Government of India” (Negotiator says Tamil Tigers believe in "political solution" 2009).
This study reveals that the Indian political attitude was such that it allowed or overlooked the 
activities of the LTTE. It is clear that the Indian government has sought to avoid upsetting Tamil 
diaspora in its territory, which decreases the level of internal threat to Tamil citizens in India.
This allowed a greater level of cooperation between the groups. For its support to the LTTE, 
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Tamils in India faced no external threat from either the Sri Lankan government or other 
countries, which allowed for cooperation between the co-ethnic groups.
In conclusion, both examples confirm that ethnic ties are extremely important factors in 
ethnic group cooperation. Nevertheless, ethnic group cooperation was greatly influenced by
external or internal threat or pressure. If groups receive a greater internal or external threat, it 
decreases the level of cooperation. In this regard, if a host state supports an ethnic violent group, 
then this will likely increase the level of cooperation among the same co-ethnic groups and 
ethnic violent group residing in the host state, such as the Indian and Syrian Governments. 
Moreover, great power(s) may influence groups’ cooperation positively or negatively, depending 
upon states’ interest, as seen especially in the Kurdish case. Nevertheless, in the case of Tamils,
there is little if any involvement. However, further studies must be conducted in order to 
extrapolate whether my hypothesis also explains non-cooperation among the same ethnic groups 
in other cases. 
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